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I. INTRODUCrION
I am continually perplexed by the lack of correlation be-
tween the amount of effort students put into their studies and
their performance on exams. When I began teaching, my mis-
sion was to develop an Academic Assistance Program to in-
crease retention and enhance academic performance of students
who are admitted into the law school via our alternative admis-
sions program. Many of these students come from culturally di-
verse backgrounds. Many succeed even though they are
predicted not to. However, some students, no matter how hard
they work, are unable to perform satisfactorily on exams.'
Others, expected to excel, do not.
Students also are perplexed by the lack of correlation be-
tween their efforts and performance. Each new term, students
line up outside my office. Few come to share "happy" news.
Most come to receive consolation and answers to questions with
similar themes: "If I had worked this hard in undergraduate
school, and if I was athletic, I would have been a Rhodes
Scholar."; "Why did I receive such a low grade?"; "I have never
received a grade lower than a B in my life; how can I face my
family?" Regardless of how well they do on exams, most stu-
dents feel like failures. As a result, by the end of the second
week of a semester, my fresh box of tissues is almost empty.
Many factors may explain this lack of correlation between
1. When I began teaching, I honestly thought that all students were capable of
learning legal reasoning. However, during the last several years, I reluctantly accepted
the fact that a few students could not shift their patterns of thought enough to master
legal reasoning. While I now concede that not all students can succeed in law school, I
still maintain that most can. My goal is to teach those students how to excel in law
school.
1997]
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effort and performance. First, a variety of nonacademic 2 factors
create barriers to learning. These factors include financial diffi-
culties, motivational problems, medical and psychological
problems, and pressures of daily life.
Second, as primarily white, middle-class institutions, law
schools create cultural barriers to learning. Many nontraditional
and diverse students experience cultural and value conflicts lead-
ing to feelings of isolation and disenfranchisement. This occurs
because voices and values reflected by differences of gender,3
sexual orientation, race,4 class, and learning abilities5 are not
2. For an excellent discussion on how psychological factors such as isolation and
alienation affect law students' academic performance, how the law school pedagogy
exacerbates the problems, and how academic support programs and pedagogical reform
can help students, see Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the
Informational Stream to Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIz. L. REV.
667 (1994). See generally G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education
in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 225 (1986); Michael E. Carney, Narcissistic Concerns in the Educational
Experience of Law Students, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 9 (1990).
3. For example, many feminist scholars are concerned that because traditional law
school pedagogy ignores womens' ways of reasoning, learning, and knowing, female
students experience alienation and isolation. The following list of articles represents
some of the current scholarship in this area. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist
Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law
School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988). See also, e.g., Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An
Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 249 (1986); Isabel Marcus et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the
Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 11 (1985); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Ques-
tions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1993); Cathe-
rine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1299 (1988); K.C. Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal
Education, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1141 (1985); Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the
Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1209 (1988). See generally Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen:
Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994);
Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV.
193 (1991); Symposium, Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and
Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1988).
4. For example, many scholars are concerned that traditional law school pedagogy
does not recognize or value students of color because they have few role models on the
faculty and because many of their values, beliefs, and experiences are not reflected in
the classroom. As a result, students of color are not achieving at a rate commensurate
with their ability. The following list is not exhaustive. See generally Frances Lee Ans-
ley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1511 (1991)
(addressing the problems created by a limited canon and arguing for conscious inclu-
sion of multicultural issues within the curriculum); Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Fore-
word: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1
(1989) (discussing the problems created by a pedagogy that assumes an "objective"
perspective that is often a white, middle-class view, that incorporates racial views in
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represented. Institutions reinforce the power structure and
serve to protect the status quo,6 leaving little room for diverse
students to find their place in the legal profession.
7
Finally, traditional law school pedagogy itself creates barri-
ers to learning because it is not responsive to law students' learn-
8ing processes. Learning theories suggest that law school
limited ways, and ultimately alienates students of color); Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461
(1993); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Juris-
prudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7 (1989); Pat Williams, Response to Mari
Matsuda, 11 WOMEN'S Ris. L. REP. 11 (1989); Robert A. Williams, Sr., Taking Rights
Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5
LAW & INEO. J. 103 (1987). See, e.g., A Report on the NBA/ABA Legal Education Con-
ference: An Assessment of Minority Students' Performance in Law School: Implications
for Admission, Placement, and Bar Passage, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 525 (1986).
There are also concerns about the politics of law school, the lack of diversity
among the faculty and student body, the tenure process, and what constitutes accepta-
ble scholarship. See generally Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minori-
ties and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988);
Clare Dalton, "The Political Is Personal" in Tenure Decisions, HARVARD L. REC., Apr.
22, 1988, at 7; Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Confess'n the Blues:
Some Thoughts on Class Bias in Law School Hiring, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 119 (1992); The
1985 Minority Law Teachers' Conference, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 383 (1986).
There are also numerous casebook critiques. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Obscuring
the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein &
Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989); Mary Irene Coombs,
Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Text-
book, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988); Nancy S. Erickson, Final Report. "Sex Bias in the
Teaching of Criminal Law," 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (1990); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Read-
ing Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065
(1985); Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade and Schwartz Torts Casebook,
18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Disability Issues in Legal Education: A Symposium, 41 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 301 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Stud-
ies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative
Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (1990).
7. I do not mean to minimize these factors and valid critiques of law school
pedagogy. On the contrary, I think these issues merit further exploration. However,
this is beyond the scope of this Article.
8. See, e.g., Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with
Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241 (1992) (criticizing the case method because it does
not duplicate adequately the kinds of tasks practitioners engage in, and claiming that
the problem method is more relevant and therefore more effective, with examples of
how the problem works in different contexts); Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Re-
ally Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57 (1992) (advocating for increased variation in teach-
ing methodology); Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case
Against the Case System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1986); John C. Weistart, The Law
School Curriculum: The Process of Reform, 1987 DUKE L.J. 317 (1987); Teaching Legal
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pedagogy may be a major reason for the lack of correlation be-
tween student effort and performance because it does not explic-
itly provide a context for understanding, analyzing, and applying
legal concepts.
Imagine what would happen if an inexperienced builder de-
cided to build an inverted pyramid without understanding the
fundamental principles about foundations, strength of building
materials, different building structures, and architectural design.
Builders might use plans but not fully understand their complex-
ity. They might be able to build the pyramid, but it would col-
lapse in the first windstorm. This is similar to what first-year law
students experience.
First, like novice builders, students need both a context and
a method to process what they learn. Because traditional law
teaching does not provide either, many students feel over-
whelmed and anxious. Such feelings can interfere with learning.9
Ethics: A Symposium, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1991). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics
by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992) (advocating for including ethical
issues across the curricula). See generally TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) (known as the
MacCrate Report).
Edwards criticizes the trend toward interdisciplinary legal scholarship because it
cannot be used in a practical sense. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Be-
tween Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). Edwards
indicates that, although there must be a balance of training students in theory and doc-
trine, an understanding of the doctrine is necessary before the student can be effectively
exposed to the theory. Id. For example, a discussion of Law and Economics is useless
to a student who has no basic understanding of the doctrine of Contracts. Conse-
quently, Edwards rejects the "graduate school" model, which incorrectly assumes doc-
trine is the easy part and can be self-taught or learned at the undergraduate level. The
response to Edwards' article was overwhelming. See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Erin Ed-
monds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025 (1993); Paul
Brest, Plus (a Change, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1945 (1993); George L. Priest, The Growth of
Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas:
A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICHt. L. REV. 1929 (1993); Paul D. Reingold, Harry
Edwards' Nostalgia, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1998 (1993); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Mad
Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice to Life, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1977
(1993).
9. Law schools create anxiety more than other graduate schools because there are
more students in each course, more capable students competing for grades, more poten-
tial employers placing a great emphasis on first-year grades, and little feedback. AL-
FRED G. SMITH, COGNITIVE STYLES IN LAW SCHOOLS 63 (1979). Although anxiety
generally is thought to affects students' cognition, Smith found no significant correla-
tion when he conducted a study to find a correlation between law students' anxiety and
their cognitive style. Id. at 65. However, Smith did find a small relationship between
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Second, problems created by an inadequate context or process
are compounded because those who teach law are also those
who excelled in law school. Even when law teachers want to be
more explicit, they often cannot break down the reasoning proc-
ess to the degree necessary to communicate it effectively to some
students. As experts, law teachers have internalized so much of
the information and process that they are not consciously aware
of all that goes into their analysis.
Third, traditional law school pedagogy is ineffective because
it does not begin teaching from the students' knowledge base
and does not progressively build upon fundamental concepts in a
useful sequence. 10 Instead, it begins with more complex con-
cepts and leaves to the student the task of getting an overview,
developing a context, and understanding the interrelationships
of principles.
These learning problems can be minimized, if not elimi-
nated, when both teachers and students work from a common
theoretical foundation like the "Learning Progression": a cogni-
tive theory that explains the evolutionary learning process of law
students." Teachers can use it to design lesson plans that target
specific stages that students are working through. Students can
use it as a blueprint for learning. In working through the sites,
students will have a more solid foundation in constructing an
analysis that will not collapse under scrutiny.
This Article explains the Learning Progression. The first
Part begins with a brief overview of the Learning Progression.
The second Part provides a primer on learning, cognitive, and
instructional theories. The third Part details the Learning Pro-
gression, site by site, with pedagogical suggestions that will assist
students.
ambiguity intolerance and anxiety. Id. at 65-66. See also Roach, supra note 2. See
generally Benjamin et al., supra note 2; Carney, supra note 2.
10. See John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full
Faculty Considers the Implications for Legal Education, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 275 (1989)
(suggesting that rather than beginning with the expectation that law students possess
the expert knowledge base and schema, it is more effective for faculty to begin students
at the novice level and facilitate their development).
11. It is possible that the Learning Progression could have a much broader appli-
cation than law school; but for now, its use has been limited to the law school setting.
1997]
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II. THE LEARNING PROGRESSION
A. Overview of the Learning Progression
The Learning Progression serves five important functions:
it describes a progression of stages contained in learning legal
analysis; it serves as a diagnostic instrument; it identifies areas in
which most students have particular problems; it explains why
students experience difficulty in these particular areas; and fi-
nally, it prescribes ways to solve these problems. The Learning
Progression will be of particular interest to teachers of first-year
courses, especially those who teach smaller sections.1
2
The Learning Progression consists of a preconstruction site
and four construction sites, which together contain a total of
twelve stages. The sites are the Technician, Drafter, Designer,
and Creator. The Designer site is broken into two sub-sites: the
Beginning Designer and the Established Designer.13 The gaps
between the sites represent the learning challenge that the stu-
dents must conquer before they can move to the next site.
A student's analysis gains sophistication and eloquence
while the student moves through the sites of the Learning Pro-
gression. The construction sites themselves represent a sequen-
tial progression. Each site presents its own cluster of stages that
students master, and each site builds on stages mastered in previ-
ous sites. 14 In contrast to the sequential nature of the construc-
tion sites, the stages within each site are not particularly
sequential. Once students master one stage within a site, they
12. The Learning Progression is relevant to all aspects of legal teaching and has
significant implications for academic support programs. However, a detailed discussion
of how it impacts these areas is beyond the scope of this Article.
13. See Appendix A.
14. This concept of building in progression is consistent with numerous theories of
development, including: Bloom's Taxonomy, Maslow's Hierarchy, Perry's Scheme, and
Piaget's Developmental Education. See, e.g., TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJEC-
TIVES; THE CLASSIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL GOALS (Benjamin S. Bloom ed., 1956);
ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (2d ed. 1968); WILLIAM G.
PERRY, JR., FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE
YEARS: A SCHEME (1968); JEAN PIAGET, SUCCESS AND UNDERSTANDING (1978).
For discussions on how legal skills build on and interact with each other, see SOIA
MENTSCHIKOFF & IRWIN P. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW
(1981); Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis", A Systematic Approach,
40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409 (1986). To understand the developmental process of law
students from a study of interviews conducted of law students during their evolution
from novice to experts, see Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like
a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 121 (1994).
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usually can master the remaining stages by exerting the same
amount of effort and using similar approaches. Mastery of these
stages enables them to build the appropriate structure on that
site and begin to bridge the gap between sites.
The Learning Progression is also a recursive process. Thus,
as students work within a site, they constantly revisit previous
ones and refine the skills they developed in the preceding
stages. 15 Each time they get a more complicated problem or be-
gin mastering a new doctrinal area, they may have to start the
whole process over again.
Some students may not actually move through all of the
sites in this progression, while others may be capable of operat-
ing at a higher level when they begin law school. However, most
students tend to follow this progression. Thus, it is useful to ap-
proach teaching as if all students move through the progression.
In doing so, no harm is done to those few students who do not
need to go through this specific sequence. In addition, students
will move faster to higher levels of sophistication.
This Learning Progression stems from my own experience
with students and is supported by a number of learning, cogni-
tive, and instructional theories. These theories emphasize the
importance of creating context, providing explicit information,
and developing students' confidence and sophistication progres-
15. This idea of recursiveness also is supported in schema theory. Studies have
found that poorly-learned information is stored as a discrete component in memory,
rather than as a single schema. Therefore, access to one component on recall provides
only weak links to the other components that should make up the schemata. Susan T.
Fiske & Linda M. Dyer, Structure and Development of Social Schemata: Evidence from
Positive and Negative Transfer Effects, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 839 (1985).
Thus, providing more memory cues should increase access to the information.
This is also consistent with Hayes-Roth's theory of knowledge assembly. Accord-
ing to Hayes-Roth, a schema (or knowledge structure) consists of components (cognits)
and links (associations) among the components. If one component is activated in mem-
ory, it activates linked components as a function of the strength of the association be-
tween them. A schema progresses with experience; it begins as a collection of
individual components and ends as a single, tightly integrated unit with strong associa-
tions among the components. Associations among related components are strength-
ened through experience until the entire structure can be activated in an all-or-none
fashion. Barbara Hayes-Roth, Evolution of Cognitive Structures and Processes, 84
PSYCHOL. REv. 260 (1977).
This model is also largely consistent with standard views of learning and memory
that rely on associative networks. Its view of learning as a qualitative change from
piecemeal to integrated processing generally agrees with procedural models of learning
that have grown out of the associative tradition. See Fiske & Dyer, supra. See also
JOHN R. ANDERSON, THE ARcrrrEcrua.E OF CooNrmON (1983).
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sively. The following provides a primer for those who do not
have a background in these areas.
B. Learning, Cognitive, and Instructional Theories
The lessons learned from these theories should be explored
in depth to provide us with more grist to develop a full critique
of law school pedagogy and to provide suggestions for reform.
However, this type of in-depth discussion is beyond the scope
and focus of this Article. Consequently, the following summary
of metacognition, schemata, expert/novice, and instructional the-
ories is intended only to provide a context in which to discuss the
Learning Progression.
1. Metacognition
Cognition is the way in which we think about, approach, ob-
tain, and process information. 16 Metacognition is the study of
how we cognate. Metacognition can best be understood as two
separate processes. First, students must understand their own
cognitive style17 and then select a study method that fits not only
this style, but also the teaching style and the subject matter.'
8
16. For examples of the differing styles of cognition among law students, see
SMiTH, supra note 9.
17. Because traditional law school pedagogy is limited to only one learning style,
it does not address the varied cognitive styles represented in each class. Students whose
cognitive style does not comport with the Socratic method will have to learn legal rea-
soning on their own. They may struggle unnecessarily until they find a way to learn the
material. Rather than force students to take extra steps and translate these teaching
methods to fit their cognitive style, law teachers should adapt their styles, methods, and
program designs to accommodate the students' diverse patterns of thought. For an ex-
ploration of effective teaching methods other than the pure Socratic method in law
school classrooms, see William Wesley Patton, Opening Students' Eyes: Visual Learning
Theory in the Socratic Classroom, 15 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 1 (1991).
18. Studies conducted of successful students showed that students who excelled
modified their method of study based on the subject matter and teaching method. In
fact, excellent students can read subtle cues from the professor and frequently are una-
ware that they are grafting the professor's way of thinking onto their own. See Paul
Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law Students, 52 ALB. L. REv. 471, 476, 477 (1988).
In conducting problem-solving protocols to identify the strategies that students em-
ployed, Smith found that students used various strategies and that some students
switched strategies as they found more efficient processes. SMrrH, supra note 9, at 85.
He also found that most students tried different strategies for different types of
problems. Id. at 86.
Some studies suggest that a few students can shift study strategies spontaneously
without being prompted. This suggests that it may not be necessary for the student to
identify the study strategy; it is only important that the student develop effective strate-
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Second, students must assess their study method. Their accuracy
in this assessment of what they have learned is essential. 19
In addition to understanding their own learning process and
developing more accurate feelings of knowing, law students also
must understand the relationship among substantive concepts
and the structure of legal discourse. Schema theory explains
how people understand these relationships.
2. Schema Theory
Schema theory20 is relevant in two ways. First, schema the-
gies. See Charles W. Anderson & Kathleen J. Roth, Teaching for Meaningful and Self-
Regulated Learning of Science, in 1 ADVANCES IN RESEARCH ON TEACHING 265, 281
(Jere Brophy ed., 1989).
In law school, successful students shift from a generic method of briefing cases to a
more stylized method based on the subject and the professor's teaching style. For ex-
ample, when I was a first-year student, I wrote briefs that contained the information in
the order the professor was likely to elicit it. I also addressed other points that the
professor was likely to bring out. Although I was aware of writing each class's brief
differently, I was not consciously aware of why I did so. In fact, I remember sitting in
my Torts class and having a fellow student look at my briefs during class. He asked me
how I knew which information to include and how I knew to put it in the same order
that the professor was discussing it.
19. In experiments conducted to explore the metacognitions students exhibited on
insight-type problems, as opposed to noninsight (objective) kinds of problems, re-
searchers found that the students' subjective metacognitions were predictive of per-
formance on noninsight problems, but their subjective metacognitions were not
predictive of performance on insight problems. Janet Metcalf & David Wiebe, Intuition
in Insight and Noninsight Problem Solving, 15 MEMORY AND COGNITION 238-39 (1987).
See also SMITH, supra note 9, at 80 (studying the correlation between students' cognitive
self-images and grades, Smith found that students' cognitive self-images did not corre-
late to their first-year Torts grades). However, he warns that given the several limita-
tions on his test, one cannot conclude that students' self-images do not affect academic
performance in a more general sense. Id at 81.
20. The assumption underlying the schema concept is that knowledge structures
allow for cognitive economy, providing people with a mechanism for making decisions
in the absence of complete information. Ruth Hamill et al., The Breadth, Depth, and
Utility of Class, Partisan, and Ideological Schemata, 29 AM. J. POL. ScI. 850 (1985). See
also RICHARD NISBEi-r & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORT-
COMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); DAVID E. RUMELHART, 1 SCHEMATA AND THE
COGNITIVE SYSTEM, HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 161 (Robert S. Wyer &
Thomas K. Srull eds., 1981); SHELLEY E. TAYLOR & JENNIFER CROCKER, SCHEMATIC
BASIS OF SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING, SOCIAL COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYM-
POSIUM ON PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Higgins et al., eds., 1981); Elea-
nor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104(3) J. EXPER.
PSYHOL. GEN. 192 (1975); J. Dennis White & Donal E. Carlston, Consequences of
Schemata for Attention, Impressions, and Recall in Complex Social Interactions, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 538, 538-49 (1983). See generally Trisha Beurig &
Daniel W. Kee, Developmental Relationships Among Metamemory, Elaborative Strat-
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ory discusses the need for creating contexts for learning substan-
tive doctrines and concepts. 21 Second, it relates to domain-
specific patterns of thought and how experts use schemata to fa-
cilitate problem solving.2
Students first must develop substantive schemata. Students
arrive at a new experience with existing schemata (contexts)
based on their past experience. As they receive new informa-
tion, they give it meaning according to how it fits into their ex-
isting schema.23 As they refine their understanding of new
information, they identify the connections between the concepts.
This enables them to expand or modify existing schemata or cre-
ate new ones.
As students recognize the relationships among these con-
cepts, they begin to develop domain-specific patterns of thought.
Mastery of these thought patterns distinguishes a novice from an
expert in a particular domain.
3. Expert/Novice Theory
Because experts have command of a large amount of
domain-specific knowledge, they can classify problems and ap-
proach problem solving quickly through a series of generaliza-
tions, abstract concepts, principles, and schemata, enabling them
to be efficient and precise. In contrast, novices may get lost in
egy Use, and Associative Memory, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 377, 400
(1987).
21. Prior exposure and experience in a specific domain area influences the selec-
tion, abstraction, interpretation, and integration of new information. See Joseph W.
Alba & Lynn Hasher, Is Memory Schematic?, 93 PSYCHOL. BULL. 203 (1983). See also
Joseph Jackson Schwab, Education and the Structure of the Disciplines, in SCIENCE,
CURRICULUM AND LIBERAL EDUCATION 229, 246 (1978).
22. For an explanation of how experts (who have realized understanding of the
sect) differ from novices in schema development, see Arthur J. Lurigio & John S. Car-
roll, Probation Officers' Schemata of Offenders: Content, Development, and Impact on
Treatment Decisions, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1112, 1113 (1985). See also
William G. Chase & Herbert A. Simon, Perception in Chess, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 55
(1980).
23. Cognitive scientists view domain-specific knowledge as structured in memory
like a cohesive group of concepts. In turn, this unitized body of knowledge makes in-
formation meaningful. Information-facts, figures, and beliefs-is organized semanti-
cally into coherent clusters of knowledge. The concept of knowledge, as distinguished
from information, implies understanding. See DAVID E. RUMELHART & DONALD A.
NORMAN, REPRESENTATION IN MEMORY (1983); Gari L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know:
Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 313, 337 (1995). See also TAYLOR & CROCKER, supra note 20, at 851.
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the details of a problem without identifying its general category.
This results in an inefficient and faulty analysis.24
Experts also internalize and organize the conventions of a
particular discourse according to specific patterns of thought.
These conventions carry implicit assumptions about both content
and structure of the discourse, and comprise domain-specific
schemata. Without such schemata, a novice, who may under-
stand the specifics of a substantive area, will be unable to use her
knowledge effectively because she will not know the structure of
the discourse, the order in which to present ideas, when to em-
phasize different concepts, and what information she needs to
make explicit versus what information is understood implicitly.
25
In law school, students need to develop schemata for the
legal system, the structure of the discourse, and the conventions
of that discourse in order to analyze legal problems accurately
and efficiently. For example, such schemata help students un-
derstand what policy arguments to make, the hierarchy of the
policy arguments, the appropriate time and place (court) to
make the arguments, and the amount of detail needed to explain
the policy.
2 6
The transition from novice to expert is an evolutionary pro-
24. See Chase & Simon, supra note 22, at 55; Lurigio & Carroll, supra note 22.
25. See Mitchell, supra note 10, at 278-79.
26. Another example in law is the (P)IRAC structure of the discourse. This struc-
ture is based on the understanding that policy influences all aspects of legal reasoning,
including how broadly or narrowly an issue is stated, what rules to apply, and what facts
should be dispositive to justify conclusions. Furthermore, the (P)IRAC structure rein-
forces the sequences of legal discourse. First, a factual situation gives rise to a legal
issue. Law or rules are created to address the legal issue. The rules then are applied to
the factual situation. Finally, a conclusion is reached about whether the rule should be
followed in this factual situation. Thus, the legal convention of writing in the structure
of (P)IRAC implies that one understand the legal system and how cases are processed.
However, law professors typically view their role as modeling the patterns of rea-
soning or the schemata of legal discourse. Consequently, they do not provide students
with sufficient substantive information or schemata. Thus, students are left to their own
devices to develop doctrine-specific schemata and often turn to commercial study aids
to provide the substantive schemata.
The difference between the information gleaned from classroom discussion and the
information from study aids can confuse students further. Also, study aids do not help
students see the interrelationship between the doctrine-specific schemata and the legal
discourse schemata. This can lead to disastrous results. By examination time, most
students have developed basic schema focusing on the black-letter law, but they have
developed schema of the legal discourse only partially. As a result, they may be missing
fundamental understandings of the relationship between various doctrines and policy-
both of the particular subject matter and of the broader legal system.
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cess in which students acquire sufficient substantive knowledge,
develop elaborate schemata, and exercise judgment in problem
solving through experience.27
The following instructional theories reinforce the impor-
tance of changing the pedagogy to include the concepts con-
tained in metacognition, schema, and expert/novice theories.
4. Instructional Theory
Many learning theorists and psychologists argue that learn-
ing and cognitive development occurs in stages.28 Although they
break down and define such stages differently, they all recognize
that students learn and develop cognitive skills progressively.
2 9
Students work from a foundation of acquired knowledge and
skills; as they learn new information and skills, they build on this
foundation to increase and strengthen connections among the
bits of information they are acquiring.
The Spiral Curriculum reflects this concept that learning is a
progressive endeavor.30 Key concepts of the Spiral Curriculum
are that teaching should begin with the most fundamental princi-
ples of the areas to be taught. These principles should be taught
in a structure (schema) and context.31 Gradually, understanding
develops and deepens when opportunities are created for stu-
dents to revisit these basic principles in increasingly complex
forms.32 Thus, the teacher begins with material gauged appro-
priately at the students' existing knowledge base, then provides
opportunities for the students to add progressively more com-
plex concepts. 33 Each time students revisit a concept, their un-
derstanding becomes better developed and more sophisticated.34
27. See Mitchell, supra note 10, at 283 (suggesting that rather than beginning with
the expectation that law students possess the expert knowledge base and schema, it is
more effective for professors to start at the novice level and facilitate students' develop-
ment of the expert schemata).
28. See supra note 14.
29. See supra note 14.
30. JEROME S. BRUNER, PROCESS OF EDUCATION 31 (1966).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id. at 53-54.
34. The Elaboration Sequence is another instructional theory premised on the no-
tion that learning is progressive. The key concept in the Elaboration Sequence is that
learning occurs as a result of simple-to-complex sequencing. The idea is to begin teach-
ing with an overview of the fundamental ideas, then progressively add layers or more
detailed and complex principles for those ideas. The layering is followed by a summary
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As these theories and models suggest, learning occurs when
the student's experience intertwines with the discipline-based
knowledge being taught. Thus, effective teaching occurs when
the instruction combines both the student's experience and the
domain-specific experience. In this way, teaching bridges the
novice's existing substantive and syntactical schemata base
35
with the expert's domain-specific substantive and syntactical
schemata.3 6
The Learning Progression articulates this process for law
students. Law teachers and students could diminish the lack of
correlation between student effort and performance by under-
standing this Learning Progression. The following Part specifi-
of the content and relationships of the ideas being taught. See generally Charles M.
Reigeluth, Lesson Blueprints Based on the Elaboration Theory of Instruction, in IN-
STRUCTIONAL THEORIES IN ACION LESSONS ILLUSTRATING SELECrED THEORIES AND
MODELS 245-88 (Charles M. Reigeluth ed., 1987).
This approach can be analogized to
studying a picture through the zoom lens of a camera. A person starts with a
wide-angle view, allowing him or her to see the major parts of the picture and
the major relationship among the parts, but without any detail. Once the per-
son zooms in on a part of the picture, the person is able to see more about
each of the major subparts. After studying those subparts and their interrela-
tionships, the person can then zoom back out to the wide-angle view to review
the other parts of the whole picture and to review the context of that one part
within the whole picture. Continuing in this "zooming in" pattern, the person
gradually progresses to the level of detail and breadth desired.
Id. at 247-48.
35. The author uses the term "syntactical schemata" to refer to the relationship
among the various components of the legal system (such as the hierarchy of courts) and
the relationship among various substantive areas (such as how the law of contracts in-
teracts with the law of property), as well as the patterns of discourse used by legal
experts (such as (P)IRAC). The author uses the term "substantive schemata" to refer
to the relationships among doctrine-specific areas (such as how, in Contracts, the doc-
trine of Consideration relates to the doctrine of Offer, and how gratuitous promises and
illusory promises relate to one another and to the doctrine of Consideration).
36. See Mitchell, supra note 10, at 283. Mitchell suggests that experts (professors)
may need to learn to start with the novice (student) schema, then work toward the
expert schema:
Professors seems to be telling students, "Here I am, see if you can get here."
If, however, thinking like an expert is principally a function of adding general
reasoning skills to a vast, complex expert knowledge base or schema, we might
focus more on students' existing schema and build from their world to ours,
articulating how our schemata converge and diverge from theirs. Such an ef-
fort would be facilitated if we began to recognize that noting is 'obvious,' that
behind every obvious concept is a complex set of assumptions, historical
knowledge, and mental procedures.
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cally examines the sites, building types, and gaps in the Learning
Progression.
C. Detail of the Learning Progression
In this Part, each construction site is more fully developed.
First, this Part discusses the gap between the preceding site and
the current site. Second, it describes the particular construction
site and building types, and gives characteristics of analysis that
the students exhibit while working on that site. Third, this Part
identifies stages that students must master within that site.
Fourth, it explores reasons students have difficulty bridging the
gap between sites. Finally, it offers teaching strategies to help
students master each site and prepare to move on.
1. Technician
a. The First Gap: Preconstruction
The gap between Preconstruction and Technician is the
transition students make from being nonlaw students to law stu-
dents. Before students are ready to begin the building sequence,
they must confront the gap between their prior learning exper-
iences and the law school experience. They must establish a
foundation of knowledge about law school pedagogy, the legal
system, and the mainstream values in the legal system. They
need to establish this foundation in order to move toward be-
coming master Technicians.
b. Characteristics of Preconstruction
Students who have not mastered the Technician site tend to
write in narrative form instead of compartmentalizing their
thinking. They discuss more than is necessary to resolve the lim-
ited issue at hand. They may not follow the (P)IRAC organiza-
tion,37 may omit a complete section (such as the rule or
application), may discuss more of the rule than is necessary, or
may apply the wrong rule to their analysis. They may include
information about irrelevant people or events,38 may fight the
hypothetical and create facts, or may reach a conclusion without
37. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
38. This may happen partially because Technicians will rely on familiar schemata.
For example, a student who was an architect might focus his discussion on the construc-
tion of the building, rather than on the contractual issue involved.
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showing the steps of their analysis clearly and explicitly. This
gap between Preconstruction and Technician is better under-
stood by knowing what a Technician masters.
c. Description of Technician
Students are ready to build on the Technician site when they
have a foundational understanding of the legal system, operant
cultural values, and law school pedagogy. Technicians begin to
learn basic syntactical and substantive schemata 39 of their
courses. They acquire and refine study techniques, learn to or-
ganize substantive information according to legal conventions,
begin to understand substantive information, learn to break
rules down into their elements, learn to categorize facts accord-
ing to what elements they address, and learn to include policy in
their analysis, albeit superficially.40 Technicians mechanically
apply basic concepts and methods to familiar problems. How-
ever, they cannot transfer their understanding to a problem that
has slight variations from previous ones because they have not
developed the underlying principles or schemata sufficiently.41
Technicians master the structural principles that enable
them to design and build a simple, single-story house. This
house is only a single-story one because students lack the ability
to add more than the bare essentials in their analysis. Thus,
although students are learning the basic principles involved, they
probably are ill-equipped to actually build anything of conse-
quence or sophistication. However, learning to build this basic
39. See Schwab, supra note 21, at 229, 246.
40. Some sources argue that law schools are not doing enough to provide their
students with the technical skills necessary to understand the theory of the law or to
explore with "disciplined imagination" other ramifications of the way in which disputes
are resolved in our legal system. See, e.g., Wangerin, supra note 14, at 409.
41. Analogy and metaphor facilitate problem-solving processes because they pro-
vide opportunities for the novice to construct situation models and to develop problem
and solution schemata. "However, analogical transfer does not occur spontaneously."
Blasi, supra note 23, at 347. For example, we might tell our students that a burglary is
an unlawful entry into the residence of another with the intent to commit a felony
therein. Then, we might tell them that Able commits burglary when he kicks in Baker's
door and enters Baker's house so that he can steal Baker's television. If we then
change the scenario so that Able knocks on Baker's door and, when Baker does not
answer, opens the unlocked door and enters so that he can steal Baker's television, the
students may not recognize that Able's act is still a burglary. Students operating at the
Technician level may have difficulty applying their knowledge-(based on the model
they have seen) that burglary may be a violent entry-to a factual situation in which the
entry is merely nonpermissive.
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structure is essential because students must master the structural
principles involved, which will allow them to build the more
sturdy and sophisticated buildings contained in the next sites.
d. Characteristics of Technician
To illustrate the different levels of analysis, consider a Torts
exam question that raises the issues of alternative medical proce-
dures and informed consent.42 In the exam question, the patient
chose an alternative treatment method. The treating physician
did not explain all of the risks associated with the alternative
treatment because the patient also was a physician and indicated
his awareness of the risks. The alternative medical treatment is-
sue provides an opportunity to see how students develop judg-
ment about what issues to discuss, how they progressively use
more facts in their analysis, and how they elaborate on the policy
analysis as they move through the Learning Progression. The
informed consent issue provides an opportunity to see how stu-
dents can restructure the basic factual arguments to form differ-
ent conclusions as they move through the progression.
Students are working on the Technician site when they ex-
hibit the following characteristics:
43
Technicians identify a sufficient number of issues in a hy-
pothetical problem, but they also might discuss nonissues be-
cause they are using a checklist to guide their analysis. For
example, the Technician included a discussion of whether Dr.
Carrass breached her duty by not ascertaining the operational
facts, even though no facts raised a duty issue.
Technicians probably discuss all of the issues, even the
raise-and-dismiss issues, in the same amount of depth, and
are conclusory. For example, in the Torts exam, the Techni-
cian analyzed the standard of care issue in more depth than
necessary.
Technicians also adhere strictly to the (P)IRAC structure
in articulating their analysis. This often creates a form-over-
substance problem. For instance, the Technician separated
one issue into two issues when she discussed whether Dr.
Carrass breached her duty as a specialist separately from her
discussion of alternative treatment methods.
42. See Appendix . A complete set of answers characteristic of the type of anal-
ysis one would see at each site is included in the Appendix.
43. See the sample analysis in Appendix B.
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Technicians include all parts of the rule, including all in-
applicable elements or exceptions to the rule. For example,
in the Torts exam, even though the question focused on a
physician's duty to her patient, the Technician included other
types of special duties in her statement of the rule.
Technicians explicitly connect the legally significant facts
to the appropriate element of the rule. For example, the
Technician wrote the following: "Dr. Brown could argue that
Dr. Carrass's alternative methods are not recognized by a
school with definite principles, and are not accepted by a re-
spectable minority within the profession because her methods
come from China and have not withstood scrutiny from the
medical community in this country."'
Technicians also might include some nonlegally signifi-
cant facts. They use the facts that obviously support argu-
ments, but often miss the less obvious facts and arguments.
The Technician incorporated only the most obvious fact (the
treatment method coming from China) to conclude that the
method did not meet the standard.
Technicians also may include ridiculous arguments, may
be unable to come up with an argument for one side when
there is an argument to be made,45 or may add facts to the
hypothetical.
Technicians may use policy in a nonintegrated way, often
adding it as an appendage. For example, the Technician
merely stated that the result "will protect patients."'
e. Stages of Technician
Technicians need to master the stages of Metacognition,
Syntactical Schemata of the Legal System, Substantive Sche-
mata, Factual Application, and Concrete Policy application.
(i) Stage 1: Metacognition
Technicians need to develop study plans that include where,
when, what, and how they will study. These study plans must be
44. See Appendix B, infra note 8 and accompanying text.
45. In studying chess players, cognitive scientists found that, although experts and
novices seem to consider the same number of possible moves, the experts were able to
focus only on strong moves, unlike the novices, who spent much time exploring both
weak and strong moves. Blasi, supra note 23, at 335. This phenomenon can help ex-
plain why technicians may lack the ability to assess effectively and appropriately the
relevancy of the parts of the rule or the arguments to be made.
46. See Appendix B, infra note 9 and accompanying text.
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assessed weekly and modified until students have designed the
study approach that works best for them.47
In addition to developing effective study strategies, students
must acquire and refine their skills in effective reading,48 note
taking, writing, and listening.4 9 If students are struggling with
these skills, they will not be able to develop more sophisticated
skills of understanding, synthesizing, and analyzing because their
mental energy and attention will be absorbed by completing
these basic study tasks. Consequently, students must become
proficient at these foundational skills quickly so they have the
time and capacity to focus on the more sophisticated skills.50
(ii) Stage 2: Syntactical Schemata
As students develop and modify their study strategies, they
also develop a syntactical schemata of the legal system 1.5  To do
this, Technicians not only need to learn information about the
components of the legal system, but they also must begin to un-
derstand the interrelationship of the various components. In ad-
dition, they must learn the conventions of the discourse and
understand the function and interrelationship of the basic units
contained in the structure of the discourse.
These units of discourse are Policy, Issue, Rule, Application,
and Conclusion. The (P)IRAC structure helps students organize
their thinking and writing in an order and manner most likely to
be understood. Technicians learn to identify these units of dis-
47. See Wangerin, supra note 18, at 474-77. See also discussion and accompanying
notes on Metacognition, supra pp. 324-25.
48. For a good summary of two reading strategies, see Wangerin, supra note 18, at
487, 496; and CRAIG K. MAYFIELD, READING SKILLS FOR LAW STUDENTS (1980).
49. Wangerin suggests that the inventory of skills students need include time man-
agement, reading, stress management, professor analysis, note taking, review/feedback,
and problem solving. Wangerin, supra note 14.
50. Law school pedagogy places high demands on students' learning and study
strategies. Many students have never developed study strategies or been challenged to
the level they are in law school. Some students succeeded in prior learning experiences
even if they were not proficient with the foundational learning skills. Once these stu-
dents begin law school, they quickly realize that their skills are inadequate because
traditional law school pedagogy assumes that students are proficient at these skills, and
the focus in class is on more sophisticated skills. Interestingly, a number of students
discover that they have previously undiagnosed learning disabilities. Many of these
students had developed coping mechanisms that disguised their disability. Once in law
school, however, their coping mechanisms are inadequate for the active study of law.
51. For example, note the function of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government, local, state, and federal systems, and the hierarchy of courts.
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course and understand each unit's purpose. Students first use
this structure to help them brief cases. Students need to distin-
guish rules from policy, holdings from dicta, and legally signifi-
cant facts from emotionally significant facts. They also need to
break down reasoning.
The (P)IRAC structure helps students analyze cases and ar-
ticulate their own analysis of a hypothetical problem. They will
begin a new paragraph for each component and use pat phrases
such as, "The issue is .... The rule is .... The plaintiff might
argue .... The defendant might argue .... The court probably
will .... This finding serves the policy of ....
As Technicians' understanding of the components of the
legal system and the conventions and units of the discourse de-
velops, their understanding of the basic moves of legal analysis
also develops.
(iii) Stage 3: Substantive Schemata
In addition to developing a syntactical schema, Technicians
develop schemata for each of the substantive areas they are
learning. Thus, they learn ways to organize the pieces of doc-
trine according to where those pieces fit in an overall schema for
that subject matter.
5 3
Substantive schemata help students assimilate new informa-
tion and categorize it so they can use it when needed. Substan-
tive schemata are important because, without it, students tend to
focus on the finer points and lose the forest for the trees. When
asked to solve a problem, they may be able to recall many specif-
ics about the area of law, but they are recalling only a jumble of
details and cannot organize their thinking quickly and logically.
52. This is known as a "script format." It is important for the students to write out
all potential arguments and learn to evaluate them before they can move into an inte-
grated format in which they include only the most persuasive arguments and do not
discuss the analysis in terms of role playing.
53. Part of learning involves placing new information in pre-existing schemata de-
veloped from prior experiences. Thus, for many students, the new information in law
school does not fit readily into their pre-existing schemata because what they are learn-
ing in law school does not reflect their experience. For example, students who have
never purchased a home may have difficulty fitting information about mortgages into a
pre-existing schema. Consequently, law teachers must find ways to help students analo-
gize their experiences so that they can fit the new information into a schema. In the




These students are unable to generalize because they do not un-
derstand fully the underlying principles that unite the pieces or
the interrelationships of the pieces.
5 4
As students acquire a context and schema for the substan-
tive area, they also learn rules and policies. Technicians learn
basic doctrinal areas, synthesize rules, and draw general princi-
ples from their synthesis. They also memorize rules and basic
policy concepts; differentiate between majority and minority
rules of law, model codes, and restatements; and develop an ap-
preciation for, although perhaps not the skill to apply, the more
subtle areas of the legal doctrines.56
Technicians use substantive schemata to help them under-
stand, recall, and identify issues, and analyze problems in those
substantive areas. Students will rely on their schemata to guide
their analysis of a case or a hypothetical problem. At this level,
they will address every main topic contained in their schema,
even irrelevant topics, or merely a raise-and-dismiss issue. Stu-
dents must train themselves to consider each topic at this point.
Later, once they internalize this process, they will do it quickly
and subconsciously.
Students must create their own schemata to refine their un-
derstanding. 7 Once they understand, they can transform their
schema to a more conventional one. Finally, students will use
this conventional schema5 8 to help them identify, analyze, and
54. See supra note 23.
55. Technicians are learning how to read cases and usually can identify the rele-
vant facts and discuss the rules and reasoning. However, they may not be able to con-
nect each case to a more abstract or general principle. Drawing these connections
begins in the outlining process. For example, as students are learning Torts, they need
to understand which are related to intent and which are related to negligence. Once
they have the main distinctions in place, they also can understand the relationship be-
tween intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. At the Technician level, the connections they draw, such as these, tend to be
more obvious.
56. This can explain why students at the Technician level often do not see the
more complex issues in a given doctrinal area or legal problem. Experts rely on deeper
structures in categorizing problems, while novices rely more on surface features. Blasi,
supra note 23, at 344-45.
57. Many students rely on commercial study aids that have a pre-formed sche-
mata. In merely memorizing a pre-formed schemata, students deprive themselves of
the opportunity to understand and internalize the doctrine and the relationship among
the various pieces. See Mitchell, supra note 10, at 284.
58. As Technicians, students begin by using these conventional schemata mechani-
cally. Once they progress to the succeeding sites, they will internalize the schema so
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organize issues contained in hypotheticals.
(iv) Stage 4. Factual Application
As students use their substantive schemata to guide their
analyses of hypothetical problems, they learn to recognize which
facts bring a particular rule into issue. Technicians may not be
able to determine when to raise and dismiss a relevant issue and
when to discuss it in depth.
Because they rely on their syntactical and substantive sche-
mata, Technicians can identify a sufficient number of relevant
issues, apply appropriate rules and exceptions, and analyze cases
based on factual analogies.5 9 They also develop the ability to
categorize facts and connect them to appropriate elements. At
this stage, students can identify facts that support opposing
views. However, they probably cannot use seemingly neutral
facts.6 °
Technicians learn to write nonconclusory analysis by includ-
ing explicitly the element of the rule and the legally significant
fact(s) in every sentence. They learn to make every connection
explicitly between the rules, policy, facts, and analogous cases.
(v) Stage 5: Concrete Policy Application
In addition to applying appropriate rules and connecting
facts to the elements of those rules, Technicians learn basic pol-
icy concepts. However, their understanding of policy is typically
superficial. At this stage, they do not comprehend fully that pol-
icy is the foundation for developing new rules, arguments, or
conclusions. Consequently, when they use policy, they do so
without developing it. Often, they use it merely to conclude that
the result is "fair."
they can move through the schema quickly and subconsciously as they analyze hy-
potheticals. The more they internalize the schemata, the more they will comprehend
sophisticated concepts and then apply more subtle analyses of the substantive area.
59. See discussion of expert/novice theory and accompanying notes, supra pp. 326-
28.
60. In legal writing, students at this stage can write a general synthesized rule,
write a mini-brief for each case, organize their discussion section around the cases, and
then write the analysis in script format. In script format, students write a paragraph for
each side's argument and one for the conclusion. Later, they will be able to write in a
more integrated format in which they synthesize the arguments into one paragraph. At
this point, it is important to require students to explain the connections they make be-
tween the facts in the analogous cases and the facts in the present case.
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f Why the Preconstruction to Technician Transition is
Difficult
In some respects, students find the Technician level more
challenging than any other level. Students are challenged be-
cause they are learning volumes of new information and many
new skills while being expected to perform as if they already
have internalized them. Moreover, students may not understand
law school pedagogy or may have poor study strategies.
What is expected of students at the undergraduate level is
vastly different from what is expected in law school. Prior to law
school, learning mainly involved memorizing and regurgitating
predigested, prepackaged, and organized information obtained
from textbooks, lectures, and the media. Consequently, they are
ill-prepared to read critically, synthesize rules, or analyze mate-
rial to the extent required in law school.
In addition, many students do not understand the rhetorical
situation of the exam. In law school exams, correctly identifying
or stating a rule is not sufficient. Students are expected to know
the rules. However, their use of the rules determines their grade.
Students also assume they are writing to a law professor who
already knows the law and the facts of the hypothetical. As a
result, students often omit rules and/or facts and do not make
their connections explicit because they assume the professor
knows the answer.
Furthermore, as novices, students may not be sufficiently fa-
miliar with the syntactical and substantive schemata of the legal
system, conventions of discourse, 61 and doctrinal areas. Their
experiences may not relate directly to the examples used in cases
and hypotheticals. As a consequence, they may lack the context
that would enable them to form their own schemata.62 Finally,
this lack of context may undermine their confidence and gener-
61. The term "conventions of discourse" refers to those patterns and ways of com-
municating (written and oral) that are the accepted norm in a given community of ex-
pertise. It includes such norms as methods of organizing information, deciding what
information needs to be included in the communication, and using particular terms of
art. In law, such conventions include the use of (P)IRAC structure to organize legal
arguments, and the omission of unnecessary information such as doctrinal areas that are
not in issue.
62. As noted earlier, learning involves students bringing their pre-existing sche-
mata to the learning task. If they do not come to law school with a schema to enable
them to make the necessary connections to what they are learning, they will not under-
stand what they are trying to learn.
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ate feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement.63 Thus, they
may lose their motivation to and interest in study.
g. Teaching Strategies to Develop Technicians
Teachers can help students become Technicians in a variety
of ways. They can teach effective study strategies,64 explicitly re-
view rhetorical situations, and clearly explain to the students
what is expected of them. Teachers also can expressly construct
syntactical and substantive schemata65 and model the structure
of the discourse, reasoning, and articulation.66 Finally, they can
give the students plenty of writing practice to help them become
comfortable with their knowledge while providing meaningful
feedback.
67
h. Checklist to Determine Mastery of Technician
Teachers can use the following checklist to determine when
a student is ready to move to the next site.68
63. Supra notes 3-5 (discussing feminist and critical race theory).
64. Teaching learning strategies and providing feedback to students is necessary to
help them become independent learners. Without such instruction and feedback, stu-
dents often will not know when or how to modify their strategies because they will not
be able to assess the effectiveness of their learning strategies. See Mary Levin & Joel
Levin, A Critical Examination of Academic Retention Programs for At-Risk Minority
College Students, 32 J.C. STUDENT DEv. 323, 328 (1991). See also Carney, supra note 2,
at 17; James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679,
1692 (1991). Such strategies should not be limited to reading and time management;
instead, they should cover the gambit of briefing, outlining, and analysis. In addition, it
is helpful to teach a variety of different approaches to allow students to find the ap-
proach that works best for them.
65. See Mitchell, supra note 10, at 283.
66. See Guinier et al., supra note 3; Carney, supra note 2, at 27 (suggesting that
seminar classes in the first year would reduce the degree of psychological distress of law
students).
67. Students need a feedback mechanism to test explicitly whether their percep-
tion of how they learn is accurate. See supra note 19. In law school, with the exception
of many legal writing courses, students receive formal feedback only once a semester
during exams, and even then the information is limited to a grade. The feedback from
classroom discussion is not necessarily accurate because students are frequently over-
anxious when they are on the "hot seat." Neither the professor nor students get an
accurate or complete picture of how well students understood the assigned reading or
applied their knowledge to solve legal problems. One way law teachers can assist all
students is to provide sample problems with various examples of analysis. This would
enable students to analyze a problem and then "check" their analysis on their own.
68. Mastering the stages of the Technician site is analogous to mastering the broad
focus of the camera lens in the example of elaboration theory. Once the broad focus is
WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW
(1) The student has clear structure and organization to her
analysis;
(2) is able to articulate rules;
(3) at times is able to be explicit in her analysis;
(4) identifies most of the issues;
(5) is aware that policy implications are relevant;
(6) strictly adheres to the (P)IRAC structure, which often
leads to form-over-substance analysis;
(7) discusses all parts of the rule, even those that are not rele-
vant, or is imprecise in articulating the rule;
(8) includes counter-arguments even when there are no argu-
ments to be made;
(9) cannot tell when an area of law is in issue, when to raise
and dismiss an issue, and when to discuss an issue at length,
and will add facts to discuss nonissues;
(10) fails to discuss most of the facts provided;
(11) analyzes at a very superficial level;
(12) adds policy in a meaningless way; and
(13) is typically inefficient.
2. Drafter
A. The Gap Between Sites
The transition from Technician to Drafter is difficult.
Whereas in the Technician site it was enough for students to ap-
ply a schema by rote, as Drafters they must learn to transfer
their knowledge to new situations and understand why they
would apply the doctrine or policy.69 To bridge this gap, students
need to shift their thinking patterns and begin to gain a deeper
understanding of what they are learning.
b. Description of Drafter
Like Technicians, Drafters tend to rely more on superficial
schemata to help them identify issues and organize their analysis.
Unlike Technicians, they incorporate more substantive and orga-
nizational sophistication in their analysis. This sophistication
mastered, students can begin to bring the more subtle areas into focus. See supra note
34.
69. For example, in our legal writing program, students write two memos in which
they make factual analogies to cases to help determine the outcome. The third memo
requires students to make a rule-choice based on policy. Students inevitably try to
make factual analogies to cases to help them resolve the rule-choice instead of making
reasoning and policy analogies to cases.
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helps Drafters move away from mechanically applying basic con-
cepts, and allows them to add their own analysis. Drafters begin
to evaluate what issues to discuss, to reorganize the elements of
the rule according to relevance, develop arguments, and justify
conclusions.
Drafters learn to build a two-story house that incorporates
factual and policy analysis on both the concrete and the abstract
levels. The first story of the structure requires the student to
analyze facts and explain why a particular rule, argument, or re-
sult is consistent with policy. The second story requires the stu-
dents to explain the broader policy implications of a given rule-
choice or decision. The second story also reflects the Drafter's
ability to analyze more complex problems.
c. Characteristics of Drafter
Students are working on the Drafter site when they exhibit
the following characteristics.7 °
(1) Drafters realize they do not have time to discuss all of the
issues they identified; they think of an argument but are un-
sure whether to make it; or they know that an issue does not
merit the amount of discussion they give it but are afraid to
shorten their discussion.
(2) Drafters tend to adhere to the (P)IRAC structure in a
formalistic way, but they do not necessarily label each sen-
tence by the component they are addressing, e.g., "The issue
is ... ." Instead, they may use a question to form the issue
statement.
(3) Drafters may vary the order in which they address ele-
ments of a rule rather, than addressing them in the order they
appear in the statute or common law rule. For example, they
may discuss all of the elements not in issue before they ad-
dress the element in issue.
(4) Drafters focus on relevant rule parts, leaving out nonap-
plicable exceptions. For example, in the Torts exam, the
Drafter knew to focus her discussion on the physician/patient
duty rather than on the other specific duties, but still included
more of the rule than was required.
(5) Drafters limit their analysis to issues the hypothetical ac-
tually raised. Because they do not fight the hypothetical, they
do not add facts or speculate about possible issues if other
70. See Appendix B.
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facts were known. However, when in doubt, which is often
the case, Drafters will raise a nonissue, albeit more briefly
than a Technician. For example, in the Torts exam, the
Drafter still included a brief discussion of whether Dr. Car-
rass breached her duty to ascertain the operational facts on
which she based her diagnosis. However, unlike the Techni-
cian, the Drafter did not speculate on what facts might be
present.
(6) Drafters develop more in-depth analysis by using more
facts in the hypothetical. They also begin to distinguish
among issues that should be raised and dismissed and those
that merit a more complete discussion. In addition, Drafters
begin to eliminate arguments that do not merit inclusion. For
example, in the Torts question, the Drafter, unlike the Techni-
cian, used facts to establish that Dr. Carrass was a specialist,
and quickly raised and dismissed the issue of whether Dr.
Cariass owed a higher duty as a specialist.
(7) Finally, Drafters begin to develop their understanding of
policy, which helps them appreciate more of the subtle areas
of the doctrine. They also incorporate policy in their analysis
meaningfully. For example, the Drafter developed policy ar-
guments to establish a medical community broader than that
of the United State in determining what community should
set the standard.
d. Stages of Drafter
To do this level of analysis, Drafters must master the follow-
ing stages: Abstract Policy Analysis, Reasoning, and Organiza-
tion. Students in this site become Drafters as they learn the
reasons behind the concepts and why they use the methods they
use to solve problems.
(i) Stage 6: Abstract Policy Analysis
Drafters recognize that "black-letter law" really should be
named "grey-letter law." Once they understand that law is not
static, they begin to focus on the policy underlying doctrinal con-
cepts. As a result, they look for policy, as well as the rules. In
addition, Drafters learn to identify and synthesize policy. Stu-
dents learn to use policy to justify rule-choices, give meaning to a
rule, make arguments, and justify conclusions or results. They
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also learn to analyze abstract problems based on policy.71
(ii) Stage 7: Reasoning
As students begin to internalize policy, they also begin to
read between the lines of cases and begin to see more of the
ambiguity in hypothetical situations. They use more facts and
policy to create arguments, thereby developing their reasoning.
(iii) Stage 8. Organization
As their reasoning develops, Drafters gain some confidence,
which allows them to vary the order of their analysis and to de-
termine what to include.72 However, their confidence is tenta-
tive; so when in doubt, they stick with formalistic organization.
As Drafters develop, they enrich the knowledge and skills
they mastered at the Technician level. Drafters will revisit the
stages they learned, this time with more depth of understanding
because their syntactical and substantive schemata are further
developed.
e. Why the Technician to Drafter Transition is Difficult
Students find the transition from the Technician to Drafter
sites difficult for a variety of reasons. Because they are novices,
some students may spend most of their time and mental energy
reminding themselves of the conventions of the discourse. This
leaves little time or energy to develop their analysis. Other stu-
dents may lack the confidence to second-guess the experts-
judges, legislators, scholars, and attorneys.
71. Numerous students stumble when asked to integrate policy into their analysis
or to develop their reasoning. They have no real sense of what policy is. When discuss-
ing policy, they write something like, "and this makes good policy because we should
only punish someone who is blameworthy." Although they use the appropriate buzz
words, the words are meaningless. Even if students have a general idea of what policy
is, they often have not expounded on basic policy concepts.
72. For example, they may discuss all of the elements that require a raise-and-
dismiss analysis together, then address the one element that is in issue even when, ac-
cording to the schema, the one in issue may be the second element. The Drafter level
can be tricky because it requires the students to know their audience. This becomes
even more crucial at the Designer level. Some teachers prefer that students raise nonis-
sues and explain why they are not in issue; others prefer that students discuss all poten-
tial issues; and still others prefer that students discuss only the most relevant issues.
Similarly, some teachers want students to analyze problems according to the structure
of the rule and to write in (P)IRAC form, while others want students to discuss only the
elements of the rule that require in-depth analysis.
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Further, students may have difficulty developing policy. Be-
cause persons who are disempowered never have been in a posi-
tion of authority to make policy, they feel inadequate.
Alternatively, teachers are asking students to articulate and ar-
gue mainstream values that they do not comprehend fully or that
conflict with their own.73
f Teaching Strategies to Develop Drafters
Teachers can help students bridge this gap between Techni-
cians and Drafters by demonstrating the next level of sophistica-
tion, providing context, and building confidence. Warning
students to expect the gap may enable them to maintain their
focus because they will know their struggles are normal.
Teachers can help students shift their approaches to learning
by modeling different variations on students' present study tech-
niques.74 This not only tells students that they should shift their
approach but also gives them ideas on ways they can develop
new strategies. Showing students the similarities between their
old strategies and the new ones assists them in making the neces-
sary changes to their study approach. For example, to show stu-
dents how to develop policy analysis, I have them treat policy as
they would a rule, by breaking out and treating the different as-
pects of the policy like they would the elements in a rule. For
instance, in the Torts question, the policy of promoting alterna-
tive medical practices would be an "element" that students
would apply to the facts in the question.
Teachers can help students develop their analysis by being
explicit about expectations and providing plenty of examples of
73. Often, to get the right answer, students must argue that mainstream values are
correct. For example, in Contracts, issues of unconscionability often revolve around a
sales contract between a rich corporation and a poor (minority) consumer. If the con-
tract clearly articulates that the rate of interest is 23% and the item purchased is a
television or a stereo (not a refrigerator or some other item that patriarchal society
labels a necessity), then the court probably will not find the interest term of the contract
unconscionable. Mainstream values presuppose that all consumers can shop around
and bargain for the best deal because of competition in the marketplace. Unfortu-
nately, that is not reality in a highly class-divided society. Many law students have lived
under powerless conditions or are at least more willing to recognize them. However, in
order to get the "right" answer, the student must argue to the professor (who statisti-
cally most likely has lived in a position of power all of his life) that the contract terms
are not unconscionable, when the student's own conscience is telling him or her that the
social conditions that force the consumer to sign the contract are patently unfair.
74. See supra note 19.
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Drafter-level analysis. If one uses only Creator-level examples,
students will try to imitate that example; but, because they have
not fully developed the underlying principles of the analysis yet,
their attempt will result in failure.
Teachers can help students develop a sensitivity to the more
subtle areas of the doctrine or help them understand the subtle
use of facts by asking them to write and answer their own hy-
potheticals that bring the subtleties into issue. This is an espe-
cially effective technique for students who do not use a sufficient
number of facts in their analysis.
Teachers can help students who are wrestling with policy by
explicitly identifying policy and modeling different possible ap-
proaches. Teachers can have students identify experiences in
which they have worked with policy in their own pre-law school
world and then help them transfer those skills to legal analysis.
Another useful technique is to play "Policy Bingo" in class.
When a student hears another student give a policy explanation
in class, the student shouts "Bingo" and then articulates the
policy.
Teachers can help students who experience a conflict be-
tween mainstream legal values and their own by encouraging
them to write their own opinions and determine whether those
opinions would change the outcome. Teachers then can use the
students' ideas to help them form policy arguments. It is essen-
tial to encourage students not to abandon their own value sys-
tem75 and not to try to make them believe in something they do
not believe in.76 One way to help them keep their own voice is
75. It is crucial that we help our students understand that by teaching them how to
argue for those mainstream values, we are not condemning them to a position of having
sold out their own value system. It is important to be explicit about the fact that the law
school exercises represent one perspective and value system and that the students must
follow the rules if they are to be rewarded with success at this level. However, we also
must reinforce that they are working toward a time when they will be encouraged to
argue for changes in the system and the recognition of new values.
It is also important to recognize that, although the law school exercises may repre-
sent a reality to the casebook author, professor, or some students, it is not the only
reality. Teachers have a duty to expose students to differing views of reality. Other-
wise, students for whom the view of reality comports will not know there are other
views; and students for whom the view of reality does not comport will feel further
disenfranchised.
76. For example, a student in criminal law challenged the premise that everyone
operates out of free will. Her point was that people who are disenfranchised, are poor,
or come from abusive backgrounds often are not in a position to exercise free will.
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to suggest they keep journals. The point is to get them to think
on a deeper level about what the laws are trying to promote and
why.
g. Checklist to Determine Mastery of Drafter
Teachers can use the following checklist to determine when
a student is ready to move to the next site.
(1) A Drafter still follows the (P)IRAC structure, but does
not label every sentence;
(2) narrows the discussion of the rules to those parts that are
most relevant;
(3) includes an argument only where there is one to be made;
(4) begins to understand when to raise and dismiss an issue
and when to discuss it in depth, but still tends to raise
nonissues;
(5) uses more of the facts than a Technician, but still needs to
use more of them;
(6) includes policy in a meaningful way, and
(7) develops more in-depth analysis.
3. Designer
a. The Gap Between Sites
Just as the transition from Technician to Drafter is a prob-
lem area, the progression from Drafter to Designer presents its
own set of difficulties. Moving to the Designer level requires
students to refine their schemata of the legal system, concepts,
and conventions of the discourse on a more sophisticated level.
In addition, it requires students to see more subtle connections
between doctrinal areas and policy and, more importantly, to de-
velop greater confidence in their analytical abilities.
b. Description of Designer
There are two subcategories within the Designer site: Be-
ginning Designer and Established Designer. Beginning Design-
ers have developed their analysis so it is thorough; but because
they may lack confidence, they include more than is necessary,
and they write in script format. In contrast, Established Design-
Because she rejected the premise, she could not develop any type of policy argument.
Rather than force her to believe in the premise, I merely asked her to begin her analysis
with the phrase, "Assuming the validity of the premise that people operate out of free
will .... " She then could make the necessary arguments.
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ers develop the thorough analysis of Beginning Designers; but
because they have more experience and confidence, they elimi-
nate any extraneous information and write in an integrated
format.
The transition from Beginner to Established Designer level
is not a major shift in the analytical process. Instead, once De-
signers learn to develop their analysis, they can learn to integrate
it with relative ease. As such, this transition does not usually
create a huge gap for students to cross.
Designers learn not only how to build a complex, elaborate
house and a simple A-frame house, but also when to build which
type. The elaborate house represents the students' ability to ex-
pand and develop their analysis in sophisticated ways. The A-
frame house represents the students' ability to streamline their
analysis where an in-depth analysis is not needed. Beginning
Designers tend to build the more elaborate houses, even when
such elaboration is not necessary. However, Established Design-
ers tend to build more A-frame structures, but only after they
have considered all potential elaborations.
c. Characteristics of Designer
(i) Beginning Designer
(1) The Beginning Designer can distinguish among nonis-
sues, raise-and-dismiss issues, and significant issues, as well as
focus on the more interesting aspects of the question. For ex-
ample, the Beginning Designer eliminated any discussion of
general or special duties owed, and instead began her analysis
with the duty owed by a physician who uses alternative meth-
ods of treatment.
(2) Beginning Designers can develop their analysis to include
all legally significant facts and focus on only essential argu-
ments. Thus, they no longer include irrelevant or insignifi-
cant facts or arguments. They also develop creative fact-
based and policy-based arguments.
(3) The Beginning Designer also supports her conclusions.
For example, in her conclusion of the issue of whether Dr.
Carrass's methods met the standard for alternative medical
treatment, the Beginning Designer incorporated policy.
(ii) Established Designer
Once Beginning Designers learn to develop their analysis,
they begin to gain confidence and can integrate such analysis,
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resulting in clear and concise articulation. Established Designers
deviate from the(P)IRAC structure, organize around concepts,
and integrate their analysis. For example, in the Torts exam, af-
ter discussing the rule for alternative medical treatment, the Es-
tablished Designer integrated the arguments for both sides.
d. Stages of Designer
The stages contained in the Established Designer site are
Sophistication, Judgment, and Proficiency.
(i) Stage 9: Sophistication
During prior stages, students focused primarily on syntacti-
cal and substantive schema and on ensuring that all necessary
units for complete analysis were present. As students' confi-
dence increases and as they revisit earlier concepts and develop
more complete schemata, they can shift their attention to the
content of their analysis. Consequently, during the beginning of
the Designer level, students develop the ability to do more in-
depth and creative analysis of a problem.
Designers develop more sophisticated analysis that goes be-
yond the obvious. For example, they use more facts, even facts
that are seemingly neutral, to develop factual arguments. They
also use facts more creatively and develop more policy-based ar-
guments. Designers manipulate and shape the organization of
their analysis to serve the area of law in question and the prob-
lem they are resolving.
(ii) Stage 10: Judgment
Designers can distinguish weaker arguments from stronger
ones and distill legal arguments down to their essence without
eliminating important analytical steps. Thus, they save them-
selves and the reader from going through exhaustive arguments
that lead nowhere. Designers organize more around the reason-
ing in the cases and are not limited to following the structure of
(P)IRAC, the rule, or the cases. They also begin to know when
to expand and develop their analysis, and when to streamline it.
(iii) Stage 11: Proficiency
Designers can perform the previous ten stages with increas-
ing speed for progressively more complicated and sophisticated
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problems containing multiple issues.77
e. Why the Drafter to Designer Transition is Difficult
Many students find themselves caught in the gap between
the Drafter and Designer sites because, at the Drafter level, they
could rely on mechanical formulas to guide their analysis. In
contrast, the Designer level requires students to break out of the
safe formulas and to exercise judgment in developing their anal-
ysis. Many students are afraid to deviate from the safe route of
mechanically following (P)IRAC and analyzing the elements of a
rule in the order they were written. Many resist changing the
order of their analysis because they lack confidence in their own
analytical abilities. Finally, many omit or fail to develop addi-
tional arguments because they lack confidence in their judgment.
f. Teaching Strategies to Develop Designers
In many respects, as students progress to higher levels, it
becomes more difficult for teachers to employ generic strategies
to help students bridge the gaps. This is partly because the
higher levels require students to develop their individual ap-
proaches and partly because they require students to have
greater confidence in their own analysis. Probably the best way
to help students at this level is to develop strategies that will
build students' confidence.
Teachers can help students by modeling the different
progressions of analysis and providing examples of different
levels of sophistication, different approaches, and different ways
to organize the analysis. These examples should include the
teacher's comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the dif-
ferent examples. Such examples guide students in ways to in-
crease the level of sophistication in their analysis.
In addition to giving students permission to be more flexible
and creative, teachers need to provide opportunities for students
to practice more creative analysis before they have a grade at
stake. This can be accomplished by giving students progressively
more difficult and complex problems to solve and then having
them critique different approaches to the analysis. Teachers also
can ask students to write progressively more complex hypotheti-
77. Experts do not necessarily take less time solving problems; however, they are
more efficient at sorting through possible solutions.
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cals and have them explain how the hypothetical presents more
challenging issues.
Teachers also can ask students to think about their choices
in their analysis, help them see alternatives, and evaluate the
choice and the reasoning processes involved in making that
choice. This can be done by interviewing each student about his
or her analysis, or setting up peer interviews. In these inter-
views, students will ask why an argument was left out. Did the
student think of it but deem it unworthy? Did the student oper-
ate under a values conflict that prevents him or her from seeing
the other side? Why did the student include an argument that
did not make sense?78 Role-playing exercises also help students
develop concern about the problem, the parties, and the
outcome.79
Teachers can use the following checklist to determine when
a student at the Beginning Designer level is ready to move to the
Established Designer level.
(1) The Beginning Designer cuts right to the chase and
quickly raises and dismisses nonsignificant issues;
(2) focuses the discussion on grey areas;
(3) integrates analysis with the rule section when ap-
propriate;
(4) develops the analysis to include more facts and policy;
(5) uses parallelism in both the content and structure of her
analysis, but still is stuck in the script format, which is overly
cumbersome and inefficient;
(6) evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments
raised; and
(7) reaches more reasoned conclusions.
78. In having the students justify why they included an argument, the teacher can
reinforce positively what the students are doing and help them gain confidence in their
judgment.
79. For example, a student in Criminal Law did not develop the other side's argu-
ment. She was asked to analyze a hypothetical in which a man beat a woman to death
with a boat oar. The hypothetical had many facts that suggested the man was provoked.
However, the student determined that the man committed first-degree murder. She did
not explore any other possibilities. It was her belief that when a man beats a woman to
death, it is first-degree murder, period, end of discussion. She could not think of any
circumstances in which such a situationcwould not be first-degree murder. However,
when asked what she would do if her son were the defendant in the case, she stopped to
consider the situation from the point of view of a mother trying to protect her son from
life imprisonment or the death penalty. In so doing, she was able to work through the
argument to support a lesser offense.
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g. Checklist to Determine Mastery of Designer
Teachers can use the following checklist to determine when
a student is ready to move from the Established Designer to the
Creator level.
(1) The Established Designer takes the developed analysis of
the Beginner Designer and integrates all of it, including the
rule and the arguments;
(2) does not use the (P)IRAC structure because it is not
needed, although it is implicit in the discussion;
(3) organizes her analysis around concepts instead of parties;
and
(4) is more efficient in her analysis.
4. Creator
a. The Gap Between Sites
The gap between Designer and Creator is the most chal-
lenging for law students and practitioners alike because the Cre-
ator level requires them to operate at an expert level. Most
students work within the Designer site for a long time before
they are ready to move to this last stage. Some may not progress
through this stage until they have been in practice for a number
of years; and some may never reach this stage.
b. Description of Creator
Creators break the mold. They look at a legal problem, de-
cide the outcome they want to achieve, and feel confident that
they can achieve their vision. Creators often operate from intui-
tion. Creators build a modernistic, inverted pyramid because
they understand the structural principles involved, and they
know how far they can stretch the materials and principles with
which they are working.
c. Characteristics of Creator
Again, because the main feature of Creator-level analysis is
its uniqueness, it is difficult to list common characteristics of
such analysis. Typically, Creators approach problems from the
abstract policy perspective and then develop the analysis that
will allow them to achieve the result they desire.
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d. Stages of Creator
(i) Stage 12: Expert
Expert is the only stage in the Creator site. People operate
at this level when they have so internalized the previous sites
that they need not think consciously about the schemata and un-
derlying principles. Therefore, they are free to think outside of
the established conventions when those conventions are either
unnecessary or ineffective.80 Consequently, they may spend lit-
tle time or effort rehashing established modes of analysis. In-
stead, they offer not only a different way to view the immediate
problem, but more importantly, to challenge the existing doc-
trines. They also reintegrate their own values because they
know how to cast them in the structure and language that will
make their values heard and accepted.
Creators are comfortable with, and have enough sense
about, the universe of law to explore all of their ideas freely.
Experts are willing to take the risks that people in the preceding
sites were afraid to take. In fact, Experts probably do not view
the action as risky because they have confidence that they can
accomplish their goals.
e. Why the Designer to Creator Transition is Difficult
Students have difficulty bridging this last gap because they
lack experience, confidence, and time to fully internalize all that
is contained in the preceding sites.
f. Teaching Strategies to Develop Creators
This last gap is the most difficult to teach, model, and articu-
late because the main characteristic of the Creator level is its
fresh and unique approach to the analysis. Probably the best
help is to ensure that students are well-established Designers
before encouraging them to try new approaches. Teachers can
create risk-free opportunities for students to try new approaches
to increase the likelihood that they will consider more creative
approaches. Therefore, teachers must allow students to try new
approaches; but if those approaches do not work, teachers
should allow students to return to the Designer level and "re-
deem" themselves.
80. See Mitchell, supra note 10.
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g. Checklist to Determine Mastery of Creator
Teachers can use the following checklist to determine when
a student is operating at the Creator level.
(1) The Creator implicitly follows an (P)IRAC structure, but
organizes more around concepts;
(2) approaches the subject first from a policy perspective and
then develops factual analysis to make specific points;
(3) considers the praptical and future implications of the
court's decision;
(4) focuses on more creative arguments in regard to the facts;
(5) demonstrates doctrinal understanding, but argues to
change standards where appropriate; and
(6) has the confidence and experience to eliminate discussion
of unnecessary issues so he or she can concentrate on the sali-
ent issues of the hypothetical.
III. CONCLUSION
This Learning Progression outlines law students' evolution-
ary learning process. It describes the evolution and provides di-
agnostic and prescriptive ideas on how teachers can use it to
increase their effectiveness.
This Learning Progression is diagnostic because it helps
teachers and students to identify what point in the progression
the student is working through. As such, teachers can focus stu-
dents on specific stages that will enable the students to master
the particular site. For example, instead of telling students their
analysis is incomplete, this Learning Progression helps to
pinpoint whether the students are struggling with the first level
of application contained in the Technician site, or whether the
struggle is at the Designer site. Such pinpointing enables the
teacher to describe what is occurring and to develop specific ex-
ercises to help the students master the particular site.
As a diagnostic tool, the Learning Progression provides
teachers with a common vocabulary to explain the students' er-
rors. For example, the author has students first discuss their
exam answers with their teachers before they come see her for
help. Often, these students will say that they have three
problems: Professor A said the analysis was undeveloped; Pro-
fessor B said it was conclusory; and Professor C said it was over-
inclusive. Understandably, this student feels completely
overwhelmed. In reality, this student's only problem was that
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the student was stuck in the Factual Application stage at the
Technician site.
In addition to its descriptive and diagnostic functions, this
Learning Progression also identifies particular problem areas
known as the gaps between the sites. In doing so, it helps teach-
ers prepare students for areas of particular difficulty. Preparing
students to approach and then bridge these gaps enables stu-
dents to keep their confidence because they understand that
their difficulties are normal and expected.
This Learning Progression also explores reasons the gaps
are present to help teachers understand the learning challenge
for the students and to reassure students that there are logical
reasons for their difficulties.
Moreover, this Learning Progression offers specific teaching
strategies to help students master the sites and build the bridges
between the sites. Some general strategies include: (1) review-
ing the Learning Progression with the students so they know
where they are going and understand how to get there; (2) ex-
plicitly teaching learning strategies and providing meaningful
feedback; (3) handing out written hypothetical problems before
class to help students focus their reading and briefing; (4) pre-
paring them for in-class discussion; and (5) providing them with
practice in writing out their analysis. 8
1
Possibly the best way teachers can use this model is to re-
member that most students must progress through this series in
sequence. Teachers can use this model explicitly to help students
understand where they are and where they are going. In addi-
tion, by referring to this model, teachers can better gauge realis-
tic expectations of their students. In so doing, teachers may
construct examples, learning exercises, and exam questions that
match the students' developmental levels. Consequently, teach-
ers who expect Established Designer analysis on the first set of
examinations may want to grade less harshly those students who
are operating at the Beginning Designer level.
It is hoped that this Learning Progression will serve as a
starting point for teachers to engage in a more thorough dia-
logue about the reasons for the gaps so that law teachers can
develop more effective teaching strategies and change teaching
81. See Moskovitz, supra note 8.
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methods to better assist students as they progress through the
building sequence.
As teachers employ this Learning Progression and engage
in such dialogues, law school pedagogy should become more ef-
fective. Thus, students' learning will be more enhanced, and
they possibly will perform at a higher level at exam time. If that
happens, my box of tissues may last longer than the first few
weeks of a semester.
WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW
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ILLUSTRATIONS OF STUDENT ANALYSIS IN THE
LEARNING CLUSTERS
1. A Torts Hypothetical
The Torts Exam Question
Dr. Carrass is the only physician in this country to offer her
controversial treatment of a rare brain tumor. This brain tumor
is benign (noninvasive) and not ordinarily fatal. It grows slowly
and typically goes undiagnosed until its growth begins to inter-
fere substantially with the neurological function of the brain.
Persons afflicted experience extreme dizziness, severe head-
aches, and loss of both vision and memory.
To date, the traditional course of treatment is surgical re-
moval of the tumor or reduction of its size, followed by radia-
tion. Once the tumor is detected, immediate surgical
intervention is the recommended treatment because, as time
passes, surgical intervention becomes more dangerous and the
likelihood of a cure diminishes. Although 90% of patients who
have surgery and radiation treatment suffer extreme nausea,
weight loss, and hair loss, 95% percent of people treated experi-
ence partial restoration of their vision and memory. In the pa-
tients who forgo treatment, the tumor continues to spread, with
consequent deterioration of neurological function to the point of
incapacitation.
Dr. Carrass, a neuro-oncologist (specialist in brain cancer),
received her medical degree and residency training from
Harvard. Dr. Carrass grew increasingly disappointed with tradi-
tional methods for treating this disease. After hearing about an
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ancient treatment used in China, she went to China and studied
at a clinic. Two years later, she completed the course of study
and received her certification to practice this treatment. Upon
her return to the United States, she opened a residential clinic.
Dr. Carrass' treatment includes biofeedback, meditation, herbal
baths, massage, and a special diet. Medical insurance plans do
not cover this treatment.
Dr. Smith is a nationally renowned neuro-oncologist. He
and Dr. Carrass appeared together on the Oprah Winfrey Show
in March 1991 to debate the merits of traditional versus alterna-
tive treatments. Dr. Carrass claimed that the clinic in China has
had remarkable results from the treatment. She claimed that the
patients had not had any side effects, and that they now function
at levels higher than those who underwent the traditional treat-
ment. Dr. Carrass did admit that a few patients showed no im-
provement after treatment and actually continued to deteriorate
as if they had not been treated. She explained, however, that
those patients did not follow the regimen strictly, and that they
did not truly believe they could be healed.
Dr. Smith severely criticized Dr. Carrass's methods and ar-
gued that the risks associated with her methods far outweighed
the benefits. He further explained that patients would be worse
off after having tried Dr. Carrass's methods because of the risks
involved when surgical intervention was delayed.
Dr. Brown, an oncologist (specialist in cancer), watched the
Oprah Winfrey Show with interest. A short time later, he began
to develop the first symptoms of the disease and subsequently
was diagnosed with it. Dr. Brown was hesitant to undergo tradi-
tional treatment because he had seen the devastating effect of
radiation treatment on his patients. In a leap of faith, he went to
Dr. Carrass' clinic. Dr. Brown told Dr. Carrass that he was an
oncologist and that he had seen her on the Oprah Winfrey Show.
He stated that he was wary of the problems with traditional
treatment but very impressed with her explanation of the disease
and the results she was obtaining with her treatment method.
He explained that he had given it a lot of thought and did not
want to suffer the ill effects of radiation treatment, so he asked
Dr. Carrass if she would treat him. Dr. Carrass did not follow
her usual procedure of explaining the disease or her treatment of
it. She merely asked Dr. Brown if he was certain that he wanted
her to treat him. Dr. Brown assured her that he did.
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Dr. Brown did not respond to the treatment. TWo years
have elapsed, and now his vision is almost completely impaired.
In addition, he no longer can remember simple items and has
such severe headaches that he often is confined to his bed. He
consulted Dr. Smith, who informed Dr. Brown that, at this stage,
his tumor is so large that surgery is very risky and could leave
him partially paralyzed. Dr. Brown is very upset about his con-
dition and wants to sue Dr. Carrass for malpractice.
Discuss the possible causes of action and defenses that each
party could raise.
II. EXCERPTS OF SAMPLE STUDENT OUTLINE
I. Negligence
A. Duty
1. General-exercise reasonable care
2. Special-duty owed dependent on relationship
a. Relationships
i) Landowner to Trespasser
ii) Landowner to Invitee
iii) Landowner to Licensee
iv) Common Carrier to Passenger
v) Innkeeper to Guest
vi) Doctor to Patient
General Rule: Physicians must have and use the knowledge,
skill, and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of
the profession in good standing. A physician will be liable if
harm results because he does not use them. When a physician
holds himself out as a specialist, the standard is modified
accordingly.
Policy: Higher standard for specialist is to protect patients.
Exceptions: When a physician offers alternative methods of
acceptable treatment, the physician is entitled to be judged ac-
cording to the school of thought the physician professes to fol-
low. The "school" must be a recognized one with definite
principles, and it must be accepted by a respectable minority
within the profession.
Policy: Tension between wanting to promote alternative
1997]
WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW
medical practices that may be more effective and less costly and
wanting to protect patients and preserve the high quality of med-
ical care currently offered in the United States. Also, concern




The Technician might analyze this problem in the following
manner:
The issue is was there a duty Dr. Carrass owed to Dr.
Brown.' In negligence law, there is a general duty to exercise
reasonable care. In this case, Dr. Carrass owed Dr. Brown a
duty to exercise reasonable care.2 In addition to general du-
ties, negligence law sometimes provides for special duties.
For example, owners of land owe special duties to occupiers
of that land, and the type of duty depends on the status of the
occupier. Common carriers and Innkeepers owe special du-
ties to their patrons.3 Physicians owe a special duty to their
patients. Here, Dr. Brown could argue that because Dr. Car-
rass was treating Dr. Brown, she owed him a special duty as
well as a general duty. Dr. Carrass does not have a good
counter-argument.4 The court will probably find that Dr.
Carrass owed Dr. Brown a special duty of care.'
The next issue is what standard of care did Dr. Carrass
owe Dr. Brown.6 In negligence law, physicians must have and
use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and
employed by members of the profession in good standing. A
physician will be liable if harm results because he does not
1. The Technician begins with the (P)IRAC structure and labels the parts of his or
her analysis.
2. The Technician mechanically recites his or her outline; so in this example, the
Technician discusses a general duty even though it is not relevant in this situation.
3. Here the Technician includes more of the rule than is necessary.
4. The Technician lacks confidence in his or her own judgment, and relies on the
established format of an argument and counter-argument. Consequently, the Techni-
cian thinks he or she needs an argument, but cannot think of one. To be safe, the
Technician writes that there is no argument. In later stages, the Technician will simply
not raise the argument.
5. Here the Technician knows he or she should reach a conclusion, but does not
explain why this is the conclusion.
6. The Technician uses the same repetitive (P)IRAC and organization of the issue.
This is not wrong, but is rather clumsy and shows a lack of sophistication.
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use them. When physicians hold themselves out as specialists,
the standard is modified accordingly.
The next issue is whether Dr. Carrass breached this stan-
dard of care. Dr. Brown could argue that the treatment em-
ployed by specialists of this disease is to surgically remove the
tumor and follow with radiation therapy. Because Dr. Car-
rass did not treat Dr. Brown with this method, she breached
her duty. Dr. Carrass could argue that she is a specialist of
the disease and that because her alternative method of treat-
ment is a valid method of treatment in China, she did not
breach her duty. The court will probably find that, because
Dr. Carrass did not follow the regular course of treatment
established by specialists in the United States, she breached
her duty.7
The next issue is whether Dr. Carrass can claim she was
using alternative methods. According to negligence law,
when a physician offers alternative methods of acceptable
treatment, the physician is entitled to be judged according to
the tenets of the school the physician professes to follow. The
"school" must be a recognized one with definite principles
and it must be accepted by a respectable minority within the
profession.
Dr. Brown could argue that Dr. Carrass's alternative
methods are not recognized by a school with definite princi-
ples and are not accepted by a respectable minority within the
profession because her methods come from China and have
not withstood scrutiny from the medical community in this
country.
8
Dr. Carrass could counter-argue that her methods are
recognized by a school with definite principles because the
Chinese clinic from where she received her training was well
established and required that physicians receive special certi-
fication before they could treat patients. In addition, her
methods are in line with a respectable minority of her col-
leagues in China.
The court will probably find that Dr. Carrass's methods
do not satisfy the requirement for alternative methods be-
cause her methods are not recognized by the medical commu-
7. Technicians know that they must compartmentalize their analysis. Here is an
example of form over substance. It really does not make sense to discuss the issue of
whether Dr. Carrass breached her duty by not following the traditional method of treat-
ment separately from the issue of alternative methods of treatment.
8. Here is an example of explicit analysis. The elements of the rule and the legally
significant facts are well connected.
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nity in the United States. This result will protect patients. 9
Another issue is whether Dr. Carrass breached her duty
by not ascertaining the operational facts. In negligence law
physicians are required to exercise reasonable care in ascer-
taining the operational facts upon which their diagnoses or
treatments are based. If Dr. Brown had a condition that
would have interfered with his ability to follow Dr. Carrass's
therapy, if Dr. Carrass did not ascertain information about
such a condition, and if knowledge about such a condition
would have affected her diagnosis or treatment, Dr. Carrass
would have breached this standard of care. However, the
facts do not indicate whether this was the case.' °
Another issue is whether Dr. Carrass breached her duty
by not getting informed consent from Dr. Brown. A physi-
cian has a duty to inform a patient of the risks" involved in
treatment or surgery.' 2 Failure to obtain informed consent
used to be viewed as vitiating consent, so it was treated as
battery. However, since 1960 it has usually been viewed as a
standard of professional conduct in negligence.' 3 In order to
prevail, the plaintiff must show that he did not have sufficient
information upon which to base his decision and that he
would have chosen a different course of treatment had he
known all of the information.
Dr. Brown could argue that Dr. Carrass did not tell him
anything about his condition or the risks associated with her
treatment. As such, he did not have all of the information to
make an informed decision. In addition, he could argue that
if he had realized the severity of the risks of postponing sur-
gery, he would have elected to have the traditional treatment
even with the radiation.
Dr. Carrass could argue that because Dr. Brown was a
specialist in cancer, he was well aware of the risks of postpon-
9. Here the Technician's conclusion does not evaluate the strengths or weaknesses
of the arguments, and the policy argument is merely a meaningless appendage.
10. Technicians may add facts to discuss nonissues because they are reciting their
exam checklist and not responding to the factual situation.
11. This is a possible incomplete statement of the rule because it could include the
fact that the physician must disclose the likelihood and the severity of the risk. Because
other rules were well developed, this could lead the reader to believe that the writer did
not know the entire rule.
12. The Technician is not precise in her statement of the rule. It is not that the
physician must be the agent of information; rather, it is that the physician must ensure
that the patient has sufficient information on which to base his decision.
13. Here, for no apparent reason, the Technician is including information about
the evolution of the doctrine.
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ing surgery. She could also argue that it would be inefficient
to require physicians to review all of the information with a
patient who already had sufficient information upon which to
base his or her decision.14
The court will probably find that Dr. Carrass did breach
her duty by failing to inform Dr. Brown about his condition
and the risks associated with her treatment. Her failure to do
so violated the elements of the informed consent doctrine.
This decision would further the policy of autonomy by ensur-
ing that patients have sufficient information upon which to
make decisions.' 5
Note that the Technician has the following characteristics in
her analysis:
(1) She has clear structure and organization to her analysis;
(2) is able to articulate rules;
(3) at times she is able to be explicit in her analysis;
(4) identifies most of the issues; and
(5) is aware that policy implications are relevant;
(6) strictly adheres to the (P)IRAC structure, which often
leads to form over substance analysis;
(7) discusses all parts of the rule, even those that are not rele-
vant, or is imprecise in articulating the rule;
(8) includes counter-arguments even when there are no argu-
ments to be made;
(9) is not able to tell when an area of law is in issue, when to
raise and dismiss an issue, and when to discuss an issue in
length, and will add facts to discuss a nonissue;
(10) fails to discuss most of the facts provided;
(11) analyzes at a very superficial level;
(12) adds policy in a meaningless way; and
(13) is typically inefficient.
B. Drafter
The Drafter might analyze this problem in the following
manner:
What duty did Dr. Carrass owe Dr. Brown?16 In negli-
gence law, there is a general duty to exercise reasonable care.
14. Here is an example of how the Technician has the beginnings of an argument,
but does not develop it or evaluate its strengths or weaknesses.
15. This is an example of how the Technician does not develop her conclusions
and how she uses policy without any apparent meaning.
16. Here the Drafter still follows the (P)IRAC structure, but does not label each
piece of his or her analysis.
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In this case, Dr. Carrass owed Dr. Brown a duty to exercise
reasonable care. In addition to general duties, negligence law
provides for certain special duties. For example, physicians
owe a special duty to their patients.17 Here, because Dr. Car-
rass was treating Dr. Brown, she owed him a special duty as
well as a general duty.'"
What standard of care did Dr. Carrass owe Dr. Brown?
In negligence law, physicians must have and use the knowl-
edge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by
members of the profession in good standing. A physician will
be liable if harm results when he does not possess or use such
skills. When a physician holds himself out as a specialist, the
standard is raised accordingly.' 9 Here, because Dr. Carrass
was a graduate of the Harvard Residency Program in Neuro-
oncology, she was considered to be a specialist in brain can-
cer."° Consequently, she owed Dr. Brown the duty to use the
knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily possessed and employed
by such specialists.
Did Dr. Carrass breach her duty by offering alternative
treatment?2 ' According to negligence law, when a physician
offers alternative methods of acceptable treatment, the physi-
cian is entitled to be judged according to the tenets of the
school the physician professes to follow. The "school" must
be a recognized one with definite principles, and it must be
accepted by a respectable minority within the profession.
Dr. Brown could argue that Dr. Carrass's alternative
methods are not recognized by a school with definite princi-
ples and it is not in line with a respectable minority of the
profession because her methods come from China and have
not withstood scrutiny from the medical community in this
country. He could continue by arguing that the standard for
determining what is acceptable medical treatment should be
what is accepted by the medical community in the United
States. To allow other countries to determine a standard
17. Here the Drafter begins to narrow his or her discussion of the rules to the
most relevant parts.
18. Here the Drafter eliminates an argument section when there is no argument
and begins to raise and dismiss when appropriate.
19. In combining the discussion of standard of care of a physician and that of a
specialist, the Drafter shows understanding of this doctrine on a more sophisticated
level.
20. Here the Drafter begins to use more facts in his or her analysis.
21. Here the Drafter separates the discussion of alternative treatment from the
standard of physician and specialist because he or she does not fully understand how
these three concepts interrelate.
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would result in a decrease in the high quality of medical care
currently offered in this country. He could point to the fact
that insurance companies do not pay Dr. Carrass for her type
of treatment to support his argument.22
Dr. Carrass could counter-argue that her methods are
recognized by a school with definite principles because the
Chinese clinic from which she received her training was well
established and required that physicians receive special certi-
fication before they could treat patients.23 She could further
argue that the United States medical community is too lim-
ited in the methods of treatment it recognizes. Further, the
standard of medical care will not be diminished by allowing
other, well-established methods of treatment that have been
proven effective in other countries to be used.24 Finally, she
could argue that insurance companies frequently do not cover
other forms of acceptable medical treatment such as chiro-
practic medicine.25
The court will probably find that Dr. Carrass's methods
do not satisfy the requirement for alternative methods be-
cause her methods are not recognized by the medical commu-
nity in the United States.26
Did Dr. Carrass breach her duty to ascertain the opera-
tional facts on which she based her diagnosis and treatment of
Dr. Brown? Physicians are required to exercise reasonable
care in ascertaining the operational facts upon which their di-
agnoses or treatments are based. There are no facts which
address this issue.27
Did Dr. Carrass breach her duty by failing to obtain Dr.
Brown's informed consent? A physician has a duty to ensure
that a patient is aware of the likelihood and severity of the
risks2 8 involved in treatment or surgery.29 Such information
22. Here the Drafter develops his or her analysis by including and discussing more
facts and policy.
23. The Drafter uses parallelism in the content and structure of her arguments.
24. Here the Drafter cannot develop an argument related to medical insurance on
behalf of Dr. Carrass; thus, this analysis is incomplete.
25. Here the Drafter brings in a useful analogy to make the argument stronger.
26. Although the Drafter uses a more developed analysis, the Drafter still lacks
the confidence to weigh the arguments accordingly. Consequently, the conclusion is
undeveloped.
27. Here the Drafter recognizes that this probably is not in issue because there are
no facts, but is hedging his or her bets by including a brief discussion of it.
28. Here the Drafter is more precise in his or her rule articulation.
29. The Drafter eliminated the evolution of this doctrine because he or she did not
use it in the analysis.
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should include the nature of the pertinent ailment or condi-
tion, the risks of the proposed treatment, and the risks of any
alternative methods of treatment. This should also include
the risks of failing to undergo any treatment at all.3 ° In order
to prevail, the plaintiff must show that he did not have suffi-
cient information upon which to base an informed decision
and that he would have chosen a different course of treatment
had he known all of the information.3'
Dr. Brown could argue that he did not have sufficient
information on which to base his decision to undergo Dr.
Carrass's alternative treatment. Dr. Carrass did not ade-
quately ascertain whether Dr. Brown knew anything about
his condition or the risks associated with her treatment. If he
had realized the severity of the risks of postponing surgery,
he would have chosen the traditional method of treatment.
Consequently, he did not give informed consent.
Dr. Carrass could respond that Dr. Brown came to her
specifically because he wanted her alternative method of
treatment. He was an expert on other forms of cancer. He
also had sufficient information because he watched the Oprah
Winfrey Show.32 During that show, the risks associated with
traditional methods of treatment and with her method were
discussed at length.33 In fact, he told her that he was im-
pressed with her statements and her results. Thus, it was rea-
sonable for Dr. Carrass to assume that Dr. Brown had
sufficient information upon which to make an informed deci-
sion. In addition, she could argue that it would be inefficient
to require her to waste time reviewing all of the information
that he already knew. Consequently, although she did not
personally review the information with Dr. Brown, he was
able to make an informed decision. In this respect, the policy
of the rule is satisfied.34
The court will probably find that Dr. Carrass is not liable
30. The Drafter has expanded on the rule here because this level of detail is im-
portant to the development of more complete arguments.
31. The Drafter appropriately elaborates on this rule to show a more sophisticated
understanding of the rule and policy.
32. The Drafter's analysis is more and more explicit because she connects the rele-
vant elements of the rule to the legally significant facts.
33. Here the Drafter has developed more of an argument by incorporating the
legally significant facts that demonstrate that Dr. Brown knew about the risks associ-
ated with treatment.
34. The Drafter still has difficulty using policy in a meaningful way. Thus, state-
ments such as this are conclusory because the Drafter did not adequately connect the
policy to the situation.
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for failing to obtain informed consent from Dr. Brown. 5
Even though she did not explicitly ascertain how much Dr.
Brown knew, it was reasonable for Dr. Carrass to assume Dr.
Brown knew enough to make an informed decision because
he was an oncologist. In addition, he told her that he was
impressed with the statements she made on the Oprah Win-
frey Show, and he specifically sought out her treatment. This
finding would support the purpose of this rule because Dr.
Brown had enough information to effectuate his own
autonomy.36
Note that the Drafter has the following characteristics in her
analysis:
(1) She still follows the (P)IRAC structure, but does not la-
bel every sentence;
(2) narrows the discussion of the rules to those parts that are
mostly relevant;
(3) includes an argument only where there is one to be made;
(4) begins to understand when to raise and dismiss an issue
and when to discuss it in depth, but still tends to raise non-
issues;
(5) uses more facts, but still needs to use more of them;
(6) includes policy in a meaningful way, and
(7) develops more in-depth analysis.
C. Beginning Designer
The Beginning Designer might analyze this problem in the
following manner:
Dr. Carrass may have breached the duty to provide ac-
ceptable treatment and the duty to obtain informed
consent.37
Dr. Carrass may have breached her duty by offering un-
accepted methods of treatment. Physicians must have and
use the knowledge, skill, and care members of the profession
35. Note the change in conclusion from the Technician's analysis. The Drafter
goes beneath the surface of the rule and explores in more depth the policy of the rule.
As a result, the Drafter is able to reach this conclusion even though, technically, Dr.
Carrass did not comply with the rule.
36. Here the Drafter supports his or her conclusion with more reasoning and
policy.
37. Here the Beginning Designer moves away from the (P)IRAC structure when
appropriate. The Beginning Designer avoids irrelevant issues, such as the general duty
of care. Further, beginning an answer with a statement like this requires the student to




in good standing ordinarily possess and employ. Physicians
who hold themselves out as specialists will be held to the
standard of the specialist. When a physician offers alternative
methods of acceptable treatment, the physician is entitled to
be judged according to the tenets of the school the physician
professes to follow, only if two requirements are met.3 8 First,
the "school" must be a recognized one with definite princi-
ples. Second, it must be accepted by a respectable minority
within the profession.39
Dr. Brown could argue that the traditional treatment
specialists in this disease employ is the surgical removal of the
tumor, followed by radiation therapy. Further, he could ar-
gue that Dr. Carrass's alternative methods are not recognized
by a school with definite principles and are not in line with a
respectable minority of the profession because her methods
come from China and have not withstood scrutiny from the
medical community in this country. He could continue by ar-
guing that the standard for determining what is acceptable
medical treatment should be what is accepted by the medical
community in the United States. To allow other countries to
determine the standard would result in a decrease in the high
quality of medical care currently offered in this country.
Courts should continue to restrict alternative methods of care
to those methods that meet the United States' standards in
order to protect vulnerable patients from trying courses of
treatment that might leave them in worse condition than if
they had undergone the traditional treatment. Moreover, he
could argue that because the medical insurance plans do not
cover the cost for Dr. Carrass's treatment, Dr. Carrass's
methods generally are not recognized as acceptable treatment
alternatives.4 °
Dr. Carrass could counter-argue that she held herself out
as a specialist in alternative methods for treating the disease,
not as a traditional specialist. The reason for the higher stan-
dard for specialists is to protect patients who rely on what the
physician has represented. When she appeared on the Oprah
Winfrey Show, Dr. Carrass publicly denounced the traditional
38. This is more precise language and gives the reader a better cue that two re-
quirements need to be satisfied.
39. Here the Beginning Designer shows his or her more sophisticated understand-
ing of the law by combining in one category the sections dealing with physicians, spe-
cialists, and alternative treatment.
40. Here the Beginning Designer develops the analysis by evaluating facts and
using them effectively with policy.
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methods of treatment. Thus, any patient who had seen this
show and sought her treatment would do so precisely because
Dr. Carrass was not a traditional specialist. In fact, Dr.
Brown, an oncologist, specifically chose not to undergo tradi-
tional methods of treatment when he contacted Dr. Carrass.
Dr. Carrass also could argue that her methods are recog-
nized by a school with definite principles because the Chinese
clinic from which she received her training was well estab-
lished and required that physicians receive special certifica-
tion before they could treat patients. She could add that this
school constitutes a respectable minority in the international
medical community. In addition, she could cite herself as a
respectable minority in this country because, as an expert in
neuro-oncology, she advocates the alternative treatment
method.
She could argue further that the United States medical
community is too limited, perhaps even outdated and archaic,
in the methods of treatment it recognizes. The standard of
medical care will not be diminished by allowing other, well-
established methods of treatment to be used that have been
proven effective in other countries. Patients turn to alterna-
tive methods of treatment because they do not deem the
traditional methods effective.
Dr. Carrass could argue that whether insurance plans
cover treatment should not determine whether such treat-
ment is an acceptable alternative.41 Insurance companies
have a vested interest in finding reasons not to pay for treat-
ment. She could cite acupuncture 42 as an example where
many insurance companies frequently do not pay for the
treatment, but where such treatment is recognized by a school
with definite principles.43
The court probably will find that Dr. Carrass's methods
do not satisfy the requirement for alternative methods be-
cause her methods are not recognized by the medical commu-
nity in the United States. It is important to maintain a
standard of care that reflects the high quality of medical care
41. The Beginning Designer makes an argument regarding insurance on behalf of
Dr. Carrass. This shows that the Beginning Designer is developing her analysis more
completely.
42. Although the Drafter used an analogy to chiropractic medicine to reinforce
her argument, the Designer uses a more precise analogy to acupuncture. This shows
that the Designer is operating on a more sophisticated analytical level.
43. Here the Beginning Designer is confident with his or her analysis to make
appropriate analogies to develop the argument.
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already established in this country. If the court were to rec-
ognize this alternative form of treatment, then all types of
questionable treatments would be used, thereby leaving pa-
tients no protection from unscrupulous health care profes-
sionals.' Courts should not be in the business of evaluating
methods of treatment from other countries. Courts should
leave such evaluations to the medical experts in this
country.45
Dr. Carrass also may have breached her duty by not en-
suring that Dr. Brown had sufficient information on which to
base his decision regarding treatment. The purpose of requir-
ing that consent be informed is to effectuate autonomy and
promote self-determination. Thus, a physician has a duty to
ensure that a patient is aware of the likelihood and severity of
risks involved in treatment or surgery. Generally, courts re-
view informed consent issues on a case-by-case basis to deter-
mine whether patients have sufficient information on which
to base their decisions and whether those patients would have
chosen a different course of treatment had they known all of
the facts.46
Dr. Brown could argue that when Dr. Carrass did not
review anything about his condition or the risks associated
with her treatment, she failed to ensure that he had sufficient
information on which to base his decision. Although he was
an oncologist, he was not a neuro-oncologist. He went to Dr.
Carrass as a patient, not as a colleague. Thus, she should
have given him the same level of disclosure that a nonspecial-
ist would have received.
In fact, it is unclear from the facts how much Dr. Brown
knew about Dr. Carrass's treatment. A talk-show debate,
when the issue was still in the abstract (because Dr. Brown
had not yet been diagnosed), is not an adequate foundation
on which to base an informed decision.
In addition, he could argue that even if he was aware of
the risks of postponing surgery, he was under some form of
44. The Beginning Designer includes a discussion of how the outcome might affect
future behavior and cases. Earlier in their development, students attempt to predict the
future impact of a decision, but these attempts tend to be more the dramatic "slippery
slope" and "parade of horribles" arguments that carry little meaning. The Beginning
Designer can better support predictions on future behavior.
45. Here the Beginning Designer develops more reasoning in his or her
conclusions.




emotional upheaval because of his diagnosis. Thus, his deci-
sion-making capacity may have been impaired by his emo-
tional reaction to his recent diagnosis. As a result, he needed
a full and complete disclosure. By not fully disclosing the
likelihood and severity of the risks associated with her treat-
ment, Dr. Carrass prevented Dr. Brown from making an in-
formed decision.47
On the other hand, Dr. Carrass could argue that Dr.
Brown demonstrated that he had sufficient information on
which to base his decision when he told her that he was an
oncologist and that he saw her on the Oprah Winfrey Show.
During that show, Dr. Smith specifically discussed the risks
associated with postponing surgery.48 Dr. Brown rejected the
traditional methods of treatment because he did not want to
suffer the debilitating effects of radiation that he had ob-
served in his patients. He said he was wary of the problems
with traditional treatment but impressed with her explanation
of the disease and the results she was obtaining with her
treatment method. He explained that he did not want to suf-
fer the ill effects of radiation treatment and then assured her
that he wanted her to treat him. Under these circumstances,
Dr. Brown was well informed about the risks associated with
his disease, the traditional methods of treatment, and Dr.
Carrass' alternative treatment methods. Consequently,
although she did not discuss with Dr. Brown his condition or
the risks associated with her treatment, Dr. Carrass acted as a
reasonable treating physician,49 both when she relied on his
representation that he had sufficient information and when
she accepted his assurance.
In this case, the purpose of requiring disclosure is satis-
fied even though Dr. Carrass did not follow her usual proce-
dure of explaining the disease or her treatment. The
determining factor is not whether the treating physician pro-
vided the information, but whether the patient had sufficient
information. The source of information is not relevant.50 In
addition, she could argue that it would be inefficient to re-
quire her to waste time reviewing all of the information that
47. Here the Beginning Designer has developed arguments for Dr. Brown that
demonstrate a higher level of understanding and more use of facts and policy.
48. Here the Beginning Designer uses more specific facts to support and
strengthen his or her argument.
49. The Beginning Designer demonstrates an understanding of subtleties such as
the reasonable physician standard.
50. Here the Beginning Designer integrates policy into her argument.
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he already knew. The costs of medical care are high enough
without requiring physicians to repeat information to their
patients when they know the patients are well-informed.
The court probably will find that Dr. Brown had suffi-
cient information on which to base his decision and that he
probably would not have chosen a different course of treat-
ment had Dr. Carrass specifically reviewed the risks involved.
When Dr. Brown sought treatment from Dr. Carrass, he told
her that he (1) was an oncologist, (2) had seen the Oprah
Winfrey Show, in which Dr. Smith cautioned against Dr. Car-
rass's treatment method, (3) was impressed with her results;
and he indicated that his decision was informed. Considering
these factors, it was reasonable for Dr. Carrass to conclude
that Dr. Brown had sufficient information on which to base
his decision. It would be not only inefficient, but also unduly
burdensome, to require physicians to review information
when a patient has assured the physician that he has sufficient
information.5
Note that the Beginning Designer has the following charac-
teristics in her analysis:
(1) She cuts right to the chase and quickly raises and dis-
misses nonsignificant issues;
(2) focuses the discussion on the grey areas;
(3) integrates analysis with the rule section when
appropriate;
(4) develops the analysis to include more facts and policy;
(5) uses parallelism in both the content and structure of her
analysis, but is still stuck in the overly cumbersome and ineffi-
cient script format;
(6) evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments
raised; and
(7) reaches more reasoned conclusions.
D. Established Designer
The Established Designer might analyze this problem in the
following manner:
Physicians must have and use the knowledge, skill, and
care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the
profession in good standing. Physicians who hold themselves
out as specialists will be held to the standard of the specialist.
51. The Beginning Designer develops his or her conclusion by including a weigh-
ing of the factual and policy arguments.
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Although the specialists in this disease traditionally treat pa-
tients by surgically removing the tumor and following with
radiation therapy, Dr. Carrass held herself out as a specialist
of alternative methods for treating the disease, not as a tradi-
tional specialist. The reason for the higher standard for a spe-
cialist is to protect patients who rely on what the physician
has represented. When she appeared on the Oprah Winfrey
Show, Dr. Carrass publicly denounced the traditional meth-
ods of treatment; so any patient who saw this show and
sought her treatment would do so not because she was a
traditional specialist, but because she was specialist in alter-
native methods of treatment. In fact, Dr. Brown specifically
chose not to undergo traditional methods of treatment when
he contacted Dr. Carrass. Consequently, because she held
herself out as a specialist in alternative methods, Dr. Carrass
is entitled to be judged according to the tenets of the school
she professes to follow if two requirements are met. First, the
"school" must be a recognized one with definite principles.
Second, it must be accepted by a respectable minority within
the profession.52
Even though medical insurance plans do not cover the
cost of Dr. Carrass's treatment, this should not determine
whether such treatment is an acceptable alternative. Insur-
ance companies have a vested interest in finding reasons not
to pay for treatment. Acupuncture medicine is an example
where many insurance companies do not pay for the treat-
ment, although it is recognized as a school with definite
principles.53
Although the medical insurance coverage should not be
determinative, the fact that Dr. Carrass's alternative methods
do not meet the standards set by the medical community in
the United States should be considered. While the Chinese
clinic from where she received her training was well estab-
lished and required that physicians receive special certifica-
tion before they could treat patients, the standard for
determining what is acceptable medical treatment should be
what is accepted by the medical community in the United
States. To use the broader international community to find a
respected minority would result in a decrease in the high
52. The Established Designer breaks free from the (P)IRAC structure and synthe-
sizes the rule and analysis so it addresses only the salient points. As a result, the analy-
sis is much smoother and well integrated.




quality of medical care currently offered in this country.
Courts should continue to restrict alternative methods of care
to those methods that meet the United States' standards in
order to protect vulnerable patients from trying courses of
treatment that might leave them in worse condition than if
they had undergone the traditional method. Finally, courts
should not be in the business of evaluating methods of treat-
ment from other countries. Courts should leave such evalua-
tions to the medical experts in this country.54 Because there
is no school or respectable minority in the United States that
endorses Dr. Carrass's treatment methods, she has breached
her duty.
Although an argument could be made that Dr. Carrass
also breached her duty by failing to obtain Dr. Brown's in-
formed consent, the court probably will conclude that Dr.
Carrass did not breach her duty. Dr. Brown had sufficient
information on which to base his decision. Consequently, he
effectuated his autonomy. As a result, he would not have
chosen a different course of treatment even if she discussed
the diagnosis and the risks associated with her treatment and
with postponing traditional treatment."
Dr. Brown was aware of the likelihood and severity of
the risks associated with the disease, the traditional treat-
ment, and the alternative treatment. 56 While it is true that
Dr. Brown was not a neuro-oncologist, he was better in-
formed than most other patients because he was an oncolo-
gist. Consequently, he was aware of the effects of radiation
and, in fact, told Dr. Carrass that he specifically did not want
to undergo traditional treatment.
In addition, although it is unclear from the facts how
much Dr. Brown knew about Dr. Carrass's treatment, Dr.
Brown indicated that he had sufficient information. He told
Dr. Carrass that he had seen the Oprah Winfrey Show. It is
true that an argument could be made that information
gleaned from merely watching a talk-show debate is not suffi-
cient. This argument could be strengthened by the fact that
54. The Established Designer discusses both sides of an issue and supports his or
her conclusion.
55. The Established Designer integrates elements of the rule into the discussion
and organizes around concepts.
56. Here the Established Designer keeps his or her analysis clear by giving reader
cues as to what the court will do and then supports his or her conclusion. Also, the
Established Designer integrates the rule into her analysis. Thus, although there is an
implicit (P)IRAC structure, the analysis is smoother.
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when Dr. Brown saw the show, he had not yet been diag-
nosed, so the issue was still in the abstract. However, during
the show, Dr. Smith specifically cautioned against Dr. Car-
rass's treatment because of the severity of the risk of postpon-
ing surgery. More importantly, during his initial consultation
with Dr. Carrass, Dr. Brown said he was wary of the
problems with traditional treatment but impressed with her
explanation of the disease and the results she was obtaining
with her treatment method. He explained that he did not
want to suffer the ill effects of radiation treatment and then
assured her that he wanted her to treat him. Under these cir-
cumstances, Dr. Brown was well informed about the likeli-
hood and severity of the risks associated with his disease, the
traditional methods of treatment, and Dr. Carrass's alterna-
tive methods of treatment. Consequently, although she did
not discuss with Dr. Brown his condition or the risks associ-
ated with her treatment, Dr. Carrass acted as a reasonable
treating physician when she concluded that he had sufficient
information based on his own expertise and statements about
his understanding of her methods.
Another possible argument could be made that Dr. Car-
rass did not act reasonably in relying on Dr. Brown's repre-
sentation that he had sufficient information. Dr. Brown's
decision making could have been affected by an emotional
reaction to the recent diagnosis. As a result, Dr. Carrass
should have done more to ensure that Dr. Brown considered
all of his alternatives objectively. However, given Dr.
Brown's representation about his knowledge and his assur-
ance that he wanted her to treat him, Dr. Carrass acted
reasonably.
In this case, the purpose of requiring disclosure has been
satisfied. The purpose of requiring that consent be informed
is to effectuate autonomy and promote self-determination.
Thus, it is less relevant whether the patient had such informa-
tion. In this case, Dr. Brown had such information. Dr.
Brown was an expert regarding cancer, and he knew the risks
associated with both the traditional method of treatment and
Dr. Carrass's method. He had seen the exchange between
Dr. Carrass and Dr. Smith on the Oprah Winfrey Show. Dr.
Brown also assured Dr. Carrass that he wanted her to treat
him. Under these circumstances, Dr. Brown was well-in-
formed about his disease and about Dr. Carrass's treatment.
It would be not only inefficient, but also unduly burdensome,
to require physicians to review information, especially when a
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patient has assured the physician that the patient has suffi-
cient information. Thus, the court probably will find that Dr.
Carrass did not breach her duty.
Note that the Established Designer has the following char-
acteristics in his or her analysis:
(1) She takes the developed analysis of the Beginner De-
signer and integrates all of it, including the rule and the
arguments;
(2) does not need the (P)IRAC structure, although it is im-
plicit in the discussion;
(3) organizes her analysis around concepts instead of parties;
and
(4) is more efficient in her analysis.
E. Creator
The Creator might analyze this problem in the following
manner:
The general standard of care established for physicians is
that they must have and use the knowledge, skill, and care
ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profes-
sion in good standing.57 This standard ensures that patients
receive a high quality of medical care.5 8 When addressing al-
ternative medical treatments, courts must balance society's
interest in maintaining high-quality medical care versus soci-
ety's interest in supporting attempts to minimize the exorbi-
tant costs of medical care in our country by encouraging the
use of effective but less costly treatments.5 9 Courts have set-
tled on a compromise that provides that physicians can em-
ploy alternative methods of treatment, but only methods
accepted by a recognized school of thought. This "school"
must have definite principles, and it must be accepted by a
respectable minority within the profession.
The real question here is whether the court should take a
narrow or broad view of what constitutes a recognized
57. Note that the Creator is unique in his approach to problem solving. Thus, this
example is merely one of several possible ways that a Creator might analyze this
hypothetical.
58. The Creator eliminates the discussion of higher standard for specialists be-
cause it is not relevant to the issue.




"school" or a respectable minority.6' Because of their con-
cern over maintaining a high quality standard of medical care,
courts are reluctant to take a broad view and define the medi-
cal community in international terms. However, an argument
could be made in support of an international community stan-
dard. An international standard would include alternative
practices that are recognized in other countries but not in the
United States. Such a standard could facilitate the use of new
methods of less expensive medical treatment. Moreover, in
taking a broad view, the court would implicitly acknowledge
the monopoly that the medical community in the United
States has on medical treatment. This medical community
has a motive not to promote alternative methods of medical
treatment, especially when such methods are less profitable
than those used by the medical community. Consequently, if
the court wants to keep the fox from guarding the chicken
coop, the court could adopt a broad view.6
If the court were to adopt this broader view and apply an
international standard, it would find that Dr. Carrass's meth-
ods meet the standard set by a "school" that is recognized in
China. Apparently, it is true that Dr. Carrass's techniques
are scientifically valid and helpful in some cases (at least, as
validated in studies on Chinese patients; no data is given as to
effectiveness on non-Asians). The Clinic in China from which
Dr. Carrass received her training was certainly well-estab-
lished, and it did require that physicians receive special certi-
fication before they could treat patients in the clinic.
While these arguments do support Dr. Carrass's argu-
ment for a baseline of care that includes accepted practices in
other countries, the court probably will take the narrower
view and find that the medical community in the United
States should set the standard for what is acceptable medical
care in this country. Currently, the United States provides
some of the highest-quality medical care in the world. If the
court applied an international medical community standard,
this standard would be lowered by the law of averages. Low-
ering the standard could result in a decrease in the high qual-
ity of medical care currently offered in this country.
In addition, the court probably will take the narrow view
60. Here the Creator eliminates much of the less relevant discussion in order to
spend more time on the salient issues.
61. The Creator analyzes more on a policy level and brings in only the specific
facts of the case when she needs to make a specific point.
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to protect vulnerable patients from trying courses of treat-
ment that might leave them in a worse condition than if they
had undergone the traditional method. Although the issue of
personal autonomy and self-determination for one's well-be-
ing is valid, the court will recognize that patients must be pro-
tected from unscrupulous medical care practitioners. Thus,
the court will limit the scope of the medical community to the
United States to protect less knowledgeable patients.
The court also will take the narrow view in order to keep
litigation costs down. To consider alternatives in other coun-
tries as a baseline would involve additional litigation costs.
These cost may be unduly burdensome to plaintiffs. In addi-
tion, the narrow view will further judicial economy and integ-
rity because neither courts nor lay jurors are medical experts.
Thus, courts should leave the evaluation of methods of treat-
ment from other countries to the medical experts in this
country.
For these reasons, the court most likely will take this nar-
row view and find that the "school" must be recognized by
the medical community in the United States. Dr. Carrass
does not meet this narrower standard. First of all, Dr. Car-
rass's alternative methods do not meet the standards set by a
respectable minority of physicians in the United States. In
fact, she is the only physician in this country that uses her
methods. One physician, even when that physician was
trained as a specialist at the Harvard Residency Program of
Neuro-oncology, does not constitute a respectable minority.
Secondly, Dr. Carrass's methods are not accepted by the
United States medical insurance industry. Medical insurance
plans do not cover the cost of her treatment. However, the
court should determine that whether insurance covers the
cost of treatment should be a neutral factor. Insurance com-
panies have a vested interest in finding reasons to not pay for
treatment. Further, they frequently do not pay for alternative
treatments that are recognized by a school with definite prin-
ciples, such as acupuncture.
For these reasons, although arguments could be made to
expand the standard of acceptable medical practices to in-
clude the international medical community, the court likely
will continue to take a narrow view and decide that Dr. Car-
rass's treatment methods are not accepted by a respectable
minority in the United States medical community. Conse-
quently, the court should find that Dr. Carrass breached her
duty to provide acceptable treatment.
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In addition to breaching this duty, when Dr. Carrass did
not follow her usual procedure of explaining the disease or
her treatment of it to Dr. Brown, she may have breached her
duty by not ensuring that Dr. Brown had sufficient informa-
tion on which to base his decision.
As the law currently stands, a physician has a duty to
inform a patient of the likelihood and severity of the risks
involved in treatment or surgery. The determining factor in
informed consent cases is whether the patient had sufficient
information on which to base his or her decision. The pur-
pose of requiring that consent be informed is to effectuate
autonomy and promote self-determination. Therefore, it is
not necessary for the physician to be the source of this infor-
mation. Rather, it is enough for the physician to ascertain
whether the patient has sufficient information.
It is true that, in situations where the patient is arguably
as informed or more informed than the physician, requiring
full disclosure is time-consuming, inefficient, and unneces-
sary. However, it is equally true that the courts should estab-
lish ways to protect a patient whose decision making may be
affected by his reaction to the diagnosis. In cases such as this,
the treating physician, at a minimum, should take steps to en-
sure that the patient is fully aware of all facts relevant to
treatment. Thus, courts should determine what steps a rea-
sonable physician would take to ensure that the patient had
sufficient information.
When viewed from this perspective, Dr. Carrass did not
take adequate steps to ensure that Dr. Brown was fully aware
of the information he needed to make an informed decision.
Even though Dr. Brown assured Dr. Carrass that he wanted
her to treat him, a reasonable physician would have done
more to ensure that the patient was sufficiently informed.
Although Dr. Brown was an oncologist, and he rejected the
traditional methods of treatment because he did not want to
suffer the debilitating effects of radiation treatment that he
had observed in his patients, he was not a neuro-oncologist;
so he was not a specialist in the same field. Consequently,
because he was not a specialist, he may not have realized the
implications of postponing brain surgery. Furthermore, even
if Dr. Brown was a specialist, because he came to Dr. Carrass
as a patient, Dr. Carrass, at a minimum, should have asked
him questions to ensure that he understood the risks associ-
ated with her treatment method.
Moreover, unlike Dr. Carrass, a reasonable physician
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would not have relied on a patient's assurances that he was
sufficiently informed when his information source was a tele-
vision talk-show program. It is true that Dr. Brown saw the
exchange between Dr. Carrass and Dr. Smith on the Oprah
Winfrey Show. During this show, Dr. Smith specifically cau-
tioned against undergoing Dr. Carrass's treatment because of
the risks involved with postponing surgery. It is also true that
Dr. Brown told Dr. Carrass that he was impressed with her
explanation of the disease and the results of her treatment.
However, a reasonable physician would not assume that such
behavior demonstrated that Dr. Brown was sufficiently in-
formed. A talk-show debate is not an adequate foundation
on which to base an informed decision. Further, Dr. Brown
saw this show before he was diagnosed, so his interest in the
disease and its treatments was general, not specific to his own
condition. Arguably, a person would listen with more care if
that person knew the information would have a direct effect
on his own life. Finally, unlike Dr. Carrass, a reasonable phy-
sician would have realized that Dr. Brown may not have been
thinking clearly when he consulted her regarding his treat-
ment. He could have been under some form of emotional
upheaval based on his diagnosis. In fact, a reasonable physi-
cian would have been alerted to his possible psychological
state because he was seeking a course of treatiment that was
different from the treatment he recommended to his own pa-
tients. As a result, Dr. Carrass should have engaged in a
more detailed discussion about the studies regarding her
treatment. Dr. Carrass should have ensured that Dr. Brown
had sufficient information about the specifics of his disease
and treatment options.
If the court allows physicians to merely accept a patient's
assurance that he has sufficient information, without checking
to be sure that he does have such information, then the re-
quirement for informed consent will become meaningless. In
this case, Dr. Carrass did not act as a reasonable physician
because she did not take adequate steps to ensure that Dr.
Brown had sufficient information about the likelihood and se-
verity of the risks associated with her treatment. By failing to
discuss such risks, Dr. Carrass deprived Dr. Brown of the op-
portunity to make an informed decision. Under these circum-
stances, the court likely will find that Dr. Carrass did not act
as a reasonable physician because she did not take additional
steps to ensure that Dr. Brown was sufficiently aware of the
information he needed to make an informed decision.
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Note that the Creator has the following characteristics in
her analysis:
(1) She implicitly follows and (P)IRAC structure, but or-
ganizes more around concepts;
(2) approaches the subject first from a policy perspective and
then develops factual analysis to make specific points;
(3) considers the practical and future implications of the
court's decision;
(4) focuses on more creative arguments in regard to the facts;
(5) demonstrates her doctrinal understanding, but argues to
change standards where appropriate; and
(6) has the confidence and experience to eliminate discussion
of unnecessary issues, so she can concentrate on the salient
issues of the hypothetical.

